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The first chapter uses an intertemporal optimal control model to analyze 
the problem of transboundary pollution that has both stock and flow 
characteristics.  In this theoretical model, firms produce a flow pollutant that 
adversely affects the state in which it was released and downstream states.  The 
pollution can be cleaned-up by removing the damaging elements from the flow 
before they enter the environment, but the removed harmful elements do not 
simply disappear.  Their disposal generates a stock pollutant that only affects the 
state in which it was generated.  The model is solved for the optimal time path for 
cleanup of the flow pollutant, and the Pigouvian tax rate that will achieve the 
optimal result.  In a transboundary setting, regulation chosen by the upstream 
polluting state will clean up less than the optimal amount of flow pollutant.  The 
 vi 
model also demonstrates that a federal regulation that ignores the stock pollutant 
will clean up more than the optimal amount of the flow pollutant. 
The second chapter presents an econometrically-estimated intertemporal 
computable general equilibrium model with labor and capital adjustment costs.  
Computable general equilibrium models are widely used for evaluating policies, 
but they generally fail to capture short run rigidities, especially in labor markets.  
This shortcoming has led to the continued use of old style reduced-form macro 
models for policy analysis in situations where short-run rigidities are likely to be 
important.  Capturing labor market rigidities is particularly important in the 
analysis of environmental regulations or other policies that strongly affect narrow 
sections of the economy.  In the long run, the industries adversely affected by 
such policies will shrink.  In the short run, however, the labor employed in those 
industries is not able to move.  The true cost of such a policy, therefore, depends 
critically on the transition path of the economy from the announcement of the 
policy to the new long run equilibrium.  Including labor adjustment costs 
addresses this problem and will allow computable general equilibrium models to 
be used for a much broader range of policy analyses than they have been in the 
past. 
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Chapter 1: Transboundary Pollution, When Flow Reduction 
Generates Stock Externalities 
1-1 INTRODUCTION 
Traditional models of pollution abatement typically examine either a stock 
pollutant or a flow pollutant.  While this may be appropriate for many scenarios, 
simply classifying a pollutant as a stock or a flow is inappropriate for a whole 
class of environmental problems.  Whenever the reduction of a flow pollutant is 
achieved by removing the pollutant from emissions before it enters the 
environment, instead of reducing the amount of the polluting input used, the 
actual pollutant does not disappear.  The removed pollutant still needs to be 
disposed of, and it may collect as a stock.  Any further damages caused by this 
stock of pollution need to be accounted for by any policy designed to control the 
flow pollutant.   
Some have researched polluting activities that generate both stock and 
flow externalities.  Wirl (1994) looks at Pigouvian taxation of energy production 
that generates both stock and flow externalities, where the market is characterized 
by strategic noncompetitive energy pricing.  In this case, energy generation 
produces carbon dioxide, a stock pollutant that contributes to global warming, and 
a flow pollutant in the form of acid rain.  Sandal and Steinshamn (1998) consider 
an optimal corrective tax as a closed form feedback control law when production 
of a consumer good generates both flow and stock externalities.  Aronsson (1998) 
investigates green tax reform in a dynamic general equilibrium model, and relates 
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the welfare effects of changes in the tax mix to responses in emission flow and the 
resulting stock of pollution, as well as employment and capital stock responses 
along the general equilibrium path.  In this case, the stock of pollution causes the 
damages and the flow of emissions simply generates the stock.  Keohane et al. 
(2000) define environmental quality as a stock variable.  They then consider 
policies with two instruments to improve environmental quality, curbing the flow 
of deterioration and restoring the stock of quality, and find that the optimal policy 
employs both instruments. 
All of the above models allow the polluting activity to generate both flow 
and stock pollutants, or they let the flow pollutant simply generate the stock 
pollutant.  This chapter considers the case where it is the efforts to reduce the 
flow externality that actually generate the stock externality.  This situation could 
occur when abatement of flow pollution is accomplished by cleaning the flow or 
removing the harmful elements before the flow is released.  In this case, the 
pollution removed from the flow still exists, and it accumulates as a stock of 
pollution.  If this new stock is potentially harmful, and dealing with it is 
nontrivial, then the generation of this stock pollutant should be considered when 
designing regulations to control the flow pollutant.  Several different kinds of 
pollution problems fit this description, including air pollution, such as sulfur 
dioxide, reduced by use of a scrubber that concentrates the sulfur into a highly-
toxic solid waste that must be stored.  Another motivating example for this 
chapter is non-point source nitrogen run-off from agricultural land.  This run-off 
collects in streams and rivers where it is a flow pollutant.  One method of 
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controlling nitrogen run-off is to plant riparian buffers where plants can absorb 
the excess nitrogen before it reaches waterways, but another method is to 
introduce no-till farming, which reduces erosion and nitrogen run-off.  While no-
till farming reduces nitrogen run-off, it has also been linked to increased levels of 
nitrate leaching into the ground water (Taylor et al. 1992).   In this situation the 
flow pollutant is prevented from entering the waterway, but some of it is 
converted to a stock pollutant when it collects in the ground water. 
In order to address these issues, this chapter uses a dynamic optimal 
control with a single control variable, representing the percentage of pollution 
removed from emissions, and a single state variable, which describes the stock 
pollution resulting from the cleaned and diverted flow.  The second section of this 
chapter builds the model and describes some of its behavioral characteristics.  In 
the third section of this chapter, we find the optimal Pigouvian tax on emissions 
and examine what happens when policy makers cannot observe, or simply ignore, 
the stock pollutant.   
Another contribution of this chapter, presented in the fourth section, is to 
consider the transformation of a flow pollutant into a stock pollutant in a 
transboundary context.1  In this case, the flow pollutant harms the state where it is 
generated as well as downstream states that it flows into.  If the flow pollutant is 
cleaned up and some of it is transformed into a stock pollutant, that stock 
pollutant stays put and only affects the state where it is created.  We revisit the 
                                                 
1 Other papers have looked at transboundary pollution in federal versus decentralized settings.  
Silva and Caplan (1997) discuss transboundary pollution control in a federal system from a game 
theoretic standpoint.  Silva (1997) looks at decentralized control of transboundary pollution when 
pollution abatement is undertaken for the sole intent of deterring immigration.   
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regulatory issues in this section from both a state and federal perspective.  In this 
situation we would expect a state regulator to under-control the flow pollutant in 
order to avoid the stock pollutant and thus to export the pollution to downstream 
states.  Federal regulators are able to implement the optimal policy if they have 
perfect information about both types of pollutant.  We also consider the case 
where the federal regulator ignores the stock pollutant.  In this situation federal 
regulators will over-control the flow pollutant.  In this setting, an optimal outcome 
can only be achieved if Coase payments between upstream and downstream states 
are possible. 
The fifth section presents the chapter’s conclusion and suggestions for 
further research.  A final twist in this chapter is to flip the roles of the flow and 
stock pollutants so that reducing the stock of pollution generates a flow pollutant.  
One example of this is a landfill where reducing the stock of garbage could 
involve incinerating it, which in turn generates a flow pollutant.  This analysis is 
presented in Appendix 1.5 along with implications for the transboundary case.  
 
1-2 THE MODEL 
The model in this chapter is an optimal control model in continuous time 
with one state and one control variable.  This model contains N firms, each of 
which emits a constant flow of emissions x .  These emissions are not a choice 
variable in this model.  This restriction simplifies the math by limiting the model 
to one control variable.  The fixed emissions case examined here could reasonably 
apply to industries that inelasticly demand the potentially polluting input.  The 
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one control variable in this model is r, the fraction of pollution removed from the 
emissions.  The total flow-pollutant is thus N(1-r) x .  The key to this model is that 
the pollution removed from the flow of emissions does not simply disappear.  
Instead, a fraction (θ) of the removed pollutant remains in a stock of pollution (s), 
while the remainder is rendered harmless. 
With the above notation, the equation of motion for the stock-pollutant can 
now be written as: 
 
1.1 sxNrs
.
δ−θ= , 
 
where δ is the decay rate of the stock.  The damage from the flow-pollutant is a 
function of the total amount of flow-pollutant, g[ x)r1(N − ], where g’ > 0 and 
g’’>0 both hold.  The damage from the stock-pollutant as a function of the stock 
is h(s), where h’(s)>0 and h’’(s)>0.  The cost per firm of cleaning up emissions is 
a function of the level of emissions from each firm and the percentage of pollution 
removed from the emissions, ( )x,rc  where 0
r
c
>
∂
∂  and 0
r
c
2
2
>
∂
∂ .  Finally, π( x ) is 
the profit level before cleanup as a function of emissions.  In this version of the 
model emissions are held constant, so the profits are constant as well. 
The social planner’s problem can now be written as: 
 
1.2 ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] dtex,rNcshxr1Ng)x(Nmax t
0r
ρ∞∫ −−−−π    s.t.   sxNrs. δ−θ= , 
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where t is time and ρ is the interest rate.  The Hamiltonian is: 
 
1.3 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )sxrNex,rNcshxr1NgxNH t δ−θΛ+−−−−π= ρ . 
 
Performing the maximization results in the following first order conditions: 
 
1.4 ( )( ) 0xNe
r
cNexr1N'gxN
r
H tt
=θΛ+
∂
∂
−−=
∂
∂ ρ−ρ−  
1.5 ( ) .tes'h
s
H Λ−=δΛ−−=
∂
∂ ρ−  
1.6 
.
ssxrNH =δ−θ=
Λ∂
∂ . 
 
Since this is an infinite horizon problem, a convenient transformation is to define 
λ such that te ρ−λ=Λ , where Λ is the present value multiplier and λ is the current 
value multiplier.  The value of the damages in year t from a small change in the 
stock-pollutant in year t is λ, the current value of marginal damages from the 
stock-pollutant.  Using this transformation, the first order conditions can now be 
written as: 
  
1.7 ( )( ) 0x
r
cxr1N'gx =λθ+
∂
∂
−−  
1.8 ( ) ρλ+λ−=λδ−− .s'h  
1.9 sxrNs
.
δ−θ= . 
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The equation of motion for the stock variable (s) is shown in 1.9, and the equation 
of motion for the control variable (r) can be found using 1.7 and 1.8.  To do this, 
we must first take the time derivative of 1.7, which results in: 
 
1.10 
( )( )
x
r
r
crxr1N''gxN
.
2
2.2
.
θ
∂
∂
+−
=λ . 
 
Then we can substitute the expression for 
.
λ  from 1.10 into 1.8 and solve for 
.
r .  
The resulting equation of motion for the control variable r is: 
 
1.11 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) 2
22
'
.
r
cxr1N''gxN
s'hx
r
cxr1Ngx
r
∂
∂
+−
θ+


∂
∂
+−−δ+ρ
= . 
 
It can be shown that the above equations of motion describe a saddle path 
stable system of differential equations.2  Given this saddle path stability, the 
assumption that the transversality condition holds, imposes that the model 
approaches the steady state as t approaches infinity.  The system can best be 
understood by use of the phase diagram in Figure 1.1.3 
 
 
                                                 
2 Confirmation of saddle path stability is shown in Appendix 1.1. 
3 The signs of the slopes of the isoclines are derived in Appendix 1.2. 
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Figure 1.1 Phase Diagram for Removal (r) and Stock (s) 
 
The saddle path in the phase diagram depicts how the fraction of pollution 
removed from emissions, r, and the stock of pollution, s, optimally evolve over 
time.  If initially the level of the stock-pollutant is too low, then the fraction of 
pollution removed from emissions will optimally begin at a high level.  Following 
the optimal path, the stock-pollutant will grow since the amount contributed to it 
from the cleanup activity is greater than the decay rate.  Optimally, the percentage 
of pollution removed from emissions should be reduced over time, and the growth 
of the stock-pollutant slows until the steady state equilibrium is reached.  If the 
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initial stock is too large, then the process is reversed.  The fraction of pollution 
removed from emissions optimally begins at a low level to allow the stock to 
decay.  As the stock decays, more pollution should be removed from emissions 
and the steady state equilibrium is approached. 
We now perform an experiment to see how the steady state levels of s and 
r change when changing θ (the fraction of the removed pollutant that adds to the 
stock).  This can be interpreted as an improvement in the cleanup technology that 
reduces the percentage of removed emissions that contribute to the stock-
pollutant.  To perform this analysis, we take the equations of motion for r and s, 
expressed as functions of r, s, and θ, and set them equal to zero: 
 
1.12 ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )
0
r
cxr1N''gxN
s'hx
r
cxr1Ngx
,s,rfr
2
22
'
.
=
∂
∂
+−
θ+


∂
∂
+−−δ+ρ
=θ≡  
1.13 ( ) 0sxrN,s,rks. =δ−θ=θ≡ . 
 
Totally differentiate these equations and express partial derivatives as subscripts 
to get: 
 
1.14 0dfdsfdrf sr =θ++ θ  
1.15 0dkdskdrk sr =θ++ θ . 
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Rearrange 1.15 to isolate dr and substitute the resulting expression into 1.14 to 
eliminate dr to get: 
 
1.16 0dfdsfd
k
fkds
k
fk
s
r
r
r
rs
=θ++θ−− θθ . 
 
Collect terms and rearrange to solve for ds/dθ results in:4 
 
1.17 
s
r
rs
r
r
f
k
fk
f
k
fk
d
ds
+−
−
=
θ
θ
θ
<
>
0. 
 
This result shows that reducing θ has an indeterminate effect on the stock.  All 
else held equal, the direct effect of reducing θ is to lower the stock-pollutant, 
since less of the cleaned emissions end up in the stock.  However, it is possible 
that the optimal response to the better cleanup technology is to increase the 
percentage pollution removed from the flow so much that the amount of stock-
pollutant actually increases.   
Now attention is turned to the effect of a decrease in θ on the level of r at 
the steady state.  Rearrange 1.15 to isolate ds and substitute the resulting 
expression into 1.14 to eliminate ds to get: 
  
                                                 
4 The signs of ds/dθ and dr/dθ are found in Appendix 1.3. 
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1.18 0dfd
k
kfdr
k
kfdrf
s
s
s
rs
r =θ+θ−− θθ . 
 
Now collect terms and rearrange to solve for dr/dθ: 
 
1.19 0
k
kff
k
kff
d
dr
s
rs
r
s
s
<
−
+−
=
θ
θ
θ
. 
 
A reduction of θ definitively increases r, the fraction of pollution removed from 
emissions.  The improved cleanup technology, lower θ, implies that less of the 
removed flow pollutant, xNr , ends up in the stock of pollution.  Since the 
negative externality associated with removing a fraction of the flow-pollutant has 
decreased, the optimal fraction of pollution removed from emissions, r, has 
increased.  
The effects of the change in θ can be seen graphically in the phase 
diagram shown in Figure 1.2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The changes in the slope of the isoclines are derived in Appendix 1.3. 
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Figure 1.2 The Effect of Changes in θ on the s and r Isoclines. 
 
This shows how the steady state levels of r and s respond to a decrease in θ.  A 
decrease in s is associated with a small increase in r and an increase in s is 
associated with a larger increase in r.  The initial response to the change in θ is an 
immediate increase in the level of r to reach the new saddle path.  The system will 
then evolve along the new saddle path and approach the new steady state 
equilibrium.  Figure 1.2 accurately depicts the 0s
.
=  isocline as linear and passing 
through the origin.  However, the 0r
.
=  isocline is not necessarily linear and does 
not necessarily rotate about a single vertical intercept as depicted in Figure 1.2.  
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Only the change in slope of the 0r
.
=  isocline is certain without assuming 
particular functional forms.  These limitations imply that no simple condition 
determines if ds/dθ is positive or negative.6  We can gain a little more 
understanding of the model by looking at the extreme case where θ = 0.  This case 
is depicted in Figure 1.3. 
 
Figure 1.3 Phase Diagram for Removal (r) and Stock (s) with θ = 0. 
 
 
The 0s
.
=  isocline becomes vertical, while the slope of the 0r
.
=  isocline falls to 
zero.  In this case, cleaning up the flow pollutant now contributes nothing to the 
                                                 
6 The expression that governs the sign of ds/dθ is found in Appendix 1.3. 
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stock.  Therefore the r will immediately jump to the new steady state level and the 
stock approaches zero according to the rate of decay. 
 
1-3 POLICIES 
Now we turn our attention to what policy will allow society to reach the 
optimum and the effects of non-optimal policies.  In a free market with no tax, the 
firm will set r=0 and not clean emissions at all since 0
r
c
>
∂
∂ .  However, a 
properly designed policy will cause the firm to choose the optimal path for r.  The 
transformed first order condition in 1.7 gives the condition that must be satisfied 
by the optimal policy.  This condition is rearranged to give us 1.20: 
 
1.20 ( )( )
r
cxxr1N'gx
∂
∂
=λθ+− . 
 
The first term on the left hand side of 1.20 is the marginal damage from the flow-
pollutant for a small change in r, the fraction of pollution removed from 
emissions.  The value of this term is positive.  The second term is the present 
value of the marginal damages from the stock-pollutant for a small change in r.  
This term is negative since 10 ≤θ≤ , 0x ≥  and λ<0.  The term on the right hand 
side of this expression is the marginal cost of increasing the fraction of pollution 
removed from emissions, which is a positive number.  If the left hand side of 1.20 
is greater than zero when evaluated at r=0, then an optimal level of cleanup exists 
1r0 ≤< .  If the left hand side of 1.20 is less than or equal to zero, then this 
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condition will not hold since 0
r
c
>
∂
∂ .  If this is the case, then the optimal policy is 
no cleanup (i.e. set r=0).  If increasing the stock-pollutant causes greater harm 
than the benefit from reducing the flow pollutant, then it is better to do nothing.  
A tax on cleaned emissions, τ, can be set to satisfy the condition in 1.20.  
The firm’s problem is to choose r to maximize profits after tax and cleanup cost: 
 
1.21 ( ) ( ) ( ) τ−−− xr1x,rcxfmax
r
. 
 
From this optimization, the firm will choose r to satisfy the condition: 
 
1.22 τ=
∂
∂ x
r
c . 
 
So, using the above equation and the optimality condition in 1.20 the resulting 
optimal tax is: 
 
1.23 ( )( )xr1N'g* −+θλ=τ  . 
 
This optimal tax rate varies over time, as λ and other variables vary with time.  
The first term on the right hand side is the present value of marginal damages 
from an increase in the stock-pollutant at any moment in time.  This term is 
negative since λ is always less than zero, and θ is bounded by zero and one.  The 
second term on the right hand side is the marginal damage from an increase in the 
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flow pollutant, which is a positive number.  The optimal tax will vary over time 
because λ changes with time.7  The firm’s response to the optimal tax is to choose 
r to follow the saddle path shown in Figure 1.1.   
Now consider what happens when the regulator ignores the damages from 
the stock-pollutant.  In this situation the regulator is only concerned about the 
flow pollutant, so the regulation is designed to satisfy the condition: 
 
1.24 ( )( )
r
cxr1N'gx
∂
∂
=− . 
 
This is equivalent to equation 1.20, with the exception that λ now is equal to zero.  
The tax that will satisfy this condition is: 
 
1.25 ( )( )xr1N'gf −=τ . 
 
This tax on just the flow pollutant omits the θλ term from the optimal tax, which 
accounted for the stock-pollutant and generated the variability in the tax rate.  
Since λ is less than zero, this tax will be greater than the optimal tax.  The 
resulting level of cleanup rf will be strictly greater than the optimal rate of cleanup 
r*.  Figure 1.4 below shows a phase diagram with both the optimal path and the 
path resulting from the tax ignoring the stock-pollutant. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The equation of motion for λ is derived in Appendix 1.4. 
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Figure 1.4 Phase Diagram When Regulator Ignores Stock-Pollutant  
 
When the regulator ignores the stock-pollutant, the level of cleanup is a constant 
that is higher than anywhere on the optimal path.  Since r is held constant, the 
path over time in the phase diagram is simply a horizontal line with the stock-
pollutant evolving to a steady state higher than the optimal steady state level. 
 
1-4 TRANSBOUNDARY FLOW  
Now we divide the affected region into an upstream and a downstream 
state, in order to introduce transboundary problems into the model.  The flow 
pollutant is emitted in the upstream state and travels to the downstream state.  
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However, the stock-pollutant remains entirely in the upstream state.  This 
modification of the model is achieved by adding the variable γ, which is the 
percentage of flow pollutant damage affecting the upstream state. The total 
amount of flow pollution damage affecting the upstream state is thus 
( )( )xr1Ng −γ , and the amount of damage affecting the downstream state is 
( ) ( )( )xr1Ng1 −γ− .  With this distinction, we can look at how a tax from a self-
interested regulator in the upstream state compares to the optimal tax.   The tax set 
by the upstream state will be: 
 
1.26 ( )( )xr1N'gup −γ+θλ=τ . 
 
This is identical to the optimal tax except for the addition of γ, which limits the 
second term of the right hand side to the marginal damage to the upstream state 
from an increase in the flow pollutant.  Since 10 ≤γ≤  and g’()>0, the tax 
implemented by the upstream state is less than or equal to the optimal tax.  This 
implies that the amount of cleanup, r, will be below the optimal level.    
Now consider the case of a federal government that ignores the stock-
pollutant, or is in an information environment where it believes the there are no 
damages from the stock-pollutant.  If the information advantage of the state 
government over the federal government is the ability to observe the stock-
pollutant, then the federal government is in the same position as the naïve 
regulator in the previous section.  Since the federal government ignores the stock-
 19 
pollutant, the federal tax will be the same as the tax on just the flow-pollutant in 
equation 1.25: 
 
1.27 ( )( )xr1N'gtf −=  . 
 
This tax accounts for the damages from the flow pollutant to the upstream and 
downstream state, but misses the damages from the stock-pollutant.  As discussed 
before, this tax is too large and results in too much cleanup.  The following 
inequalities sum up the dilemma faced in this situation: 
 
1.28 
f*up
f*up
rrr ≤≤
τ≤τ≤τ . 
 
The local regulator has the best information, but ignores the downstream effects.  
This results in a tax that is too low and too little cleanup.  The upstream state is 
quite happy with this situation, because it is able to export more of its pollution to 
the downstream state than at the optimum.  The federal government can account 
for the downstream pollution; however, since it is unaware of the stock-pollutant, 
it is unable to account for it.  This results in a tax that is too high and too much 
cleanup.  This situation benefits the downstream state at the expense of the 
upstream state.  The downstream state is made better off by the excess reduction 
of the flow pollutant, while the upstream state suffers from the increased amounts 
of the stock-pollutant.   
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In order to reach an optimum in the setting where only the state 
government is aware of the stock-pollutant, a mechanism must exist to allow for 
Coase payments between the states.8  If property rights are granted to the 
upstream state, then regulators from the upstream state would initially set a 
Pigouvian tax rate equal to τup (1.26).  If the downstream state is allowed to make 
Coase payments that subsidize the firm’s cleanup efforts, then the firm’s new 
maximization problem is: 
 
1.29 ( ) ( ) ( ) dwnup
r
subxrxr1x,rcxfmax ⋅⋅+τ⋅⋅−−− , 
 
where subdwn is the price of the downstream state’s cleanup subsidy.  The 
downstream state will be willing to pay the following subsidy to each firm for 
every unit of flow pollutant it removes ( xr ): 
 
1.30 ( )( )xr1N'g)1(subdwn −γ−= . 
 
The combination of this subsidy and the upstream state’s Pigouvian tax will 
optimally control the flow pollutant. 
                                                 
8 There are a number of ways to set up the Coase payments.  While the presentation here grants 
property rights to the upstream state and has the downstream state pay the firm directly, it would 
also be possible to have payments directly to the state, and to assign property rights to either state. 
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1-5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that in situations where cleaning up a flow 
pollutant produces a stock-pollutant as a byproduct, consideration of that stock-
pollutant is important for designing an optimal policy to control the pollutant.  
Furthermore, this chapter has shown that in certain information environments, it 
may be difficult to achieve the optimal result.  Under these information 
environments, if property rights are well defined, then states may be able to 
negotiate Coase payments to achieve the optimal level of control.  While this 
model applies to many situations, such as sulfur dioxide scrubbers and no-till 
farming used to reduce nitrogen run-off, there are many other situations that slight 
variations of this model apply to.  Appendix 1.5 demonstrates how the model can 
be altered to find an optimal policy when reducing a stock-pollutant generates a 
flow-pollutant.  This situation applies to any solid-waste pollutant that can either 
be stored in a landfill or incinerated. 
Several extensions of this research are possible.  A simple twist on this 
model is to examine the situation where a flow pollutant from an upstream state 
collects as a stock-pollutant in a downstream state.  To make this a simple 
scenario, cleaning up the flow pollutant in the upstream state would not be 
modeled as creating a stock-pollutant.  A model with downstream stock pollution 
and upstream stock pollution resulting from cleaning up the flow would have two 
stock variables and only one control variable.  This would preclude finding a 
theoretical solution.  Another possible extension is to add another control variable 
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to the model by allowing the firms to vary the amount of emissions they use in 
production.  It would also be possible to introduce uncertainty into this model, 
either in the damage functions, or in the effectiveness of the control measures.  
Finally, one could look at particular examples of this problem, specify functional 
forms, and estimate the parameters of the model in order to find real world 
optimal tax rates.  This could be important for seeing if the optimal tax rate 
changes significantly over time or if a more feasible constant tax rate can 
approximate the time path of the optimal tax rate. 
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Chapter 2: An Intertemporal Computable General Equilibrium 
Model with Labor and Capital Adjustment Costs 
2-1 INTRODUCTION 
Adjustment costs can be critical in describing how an economy evolves 
after a shock or after the implementation of a new policy.  Many applied 
economic models focus on a single period, however, either a short run equilibrium 
or the long run steady state.  These models often ignore transitional dynamics and 
have no role for adjustment costs.  A growing number of computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models have included intertemporal behavior and explicitly 
modeled investment with capital adjustment costs.  However, they still generally 
assume perfect mobility of workers between occupations and industries – despite 
the empirical evidence demonstrating the importance of labor adjustment costs in 
firms’ dynamic behavior.  These types of models are clearly inappropriate for 
analyzing many types of policies.  Particularly problematic for these models are 
environmental policies that strongly affect a narrow section of the economy.  In 
the long run, the industries adversely affected by such policies will shrink.  In the 
short run, however, the labor employed in those industries is not able to move.  
Labor adjustment costs prevent miners from quickly becoming computer 
programmers, for example.  The true cost of the policy critically depends on how 
the economy transitions to the long run equilibrium.  While traditional 
computable general equilibrium models may accurately capture the long run 
effects of the policy, they miss the important dynamic transition to the long run. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to present a CGE model that includes both 
capital and labor adjustment costs in order to capture transitional dynamics and 
the short-run costs associated with policy proposals in addition to the long run 
costs.  The model presented here is a small general equilibrium model built to 
demonstrate a method for including labor adjustment costs in a CGE context.  The 
model shows the importance of labor adjustment costs in determining firms’ 
dynamic responses to changes and other shocks.  Furthermore, the model 
demonstrates the need to consider labor adjustment costs in a general equilibrium 
context.  For simplicity, labor adjustment costs are incorporated into one sector 
only.  This formulation can be thought to imply that only one sector requires labor 
with firm-specific skills.  The other sectors employ labor with general skills.  A 
single population of workers may be employed in two different types of jobs: they 
may have ‘salaried’ jobs in the sector with labor adjustment costs, or they may 
have ‘hourly’ jobs in any sector.  The workers with salaried jobs can be thought of 
as workers that have been trained with firm-specific skills.  The workers with 
hourly jobs, on the other hand, can be considered general-skills workers, meaning 
that they do not have any firm-specific skills.  All workers can choose their level 
of effort.  This is a discrete choice, workers may choose a high level of effort, or 
they may choose to shirk and exert a low level of effort.  The effort level of 
workers in hourly jobs is perfectly observable, so these workers are unable to get 
away with shirking.  However, the effort level of workers with salaried jobs is not 
perfectly observable.  These workers have the option to shirk, and a chance to get 
away with it.  If they are caught shirking, they loose their salaried job and must 
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find work in an hourly job.  The firm employing salaried workers thus has an 
incentive to pay them an efficiency wage premium to ensure they exert a high 
level of effort.9  This simple formulation allows labor adjustment costs to be 
incorporated without making the model overly complex.  Using the methodology 
presented here, it would be possible to extend the model to include labor 
adjustment costs in all sectors.  The inclusion of labor adjustment costs opens up 
many other possibilities for CGE models. 
Large literatures exist studying both labor adjustment costs10 and capital 
adjustment costs11, but only the latter appear in CGE models.  The inclusion of 
labor adjustment costs in intertemporal CGE models has many potential benefits.  
Traditionally, CGE models have used four different ways of modeling labor 
supply.  The two simplest methods use either a fixed exogenous labor supply or a 
fixed exogenous wage rate.12  In both of these cases, no decision needs to be 
modeled.  Instead, the first case simply represents a ‘long run neo-classical’ 
situation with full employment.  The fixed exogenous wage rate in the second 
case is imposed on an otherwise normal labor supply and demand curves, 
resulting in a slack labor market with unemployment.  Third, McKibbin and Sachs 
(1989) provide a model with a fixed but slowly adjusting wage rate.  While this 
                                                 
9 See Shob (2003) for a survey of the double dividend hypothesis of environmental taxes, 
including employment and welfare effects in the presence of unemployment, which are sometimes 
modeled using efficiency wages. 
10 See Hamermesh and Pfann (1996b) for an extensive overview of factor adjustment costs with a 
focus on labor adjustment costs. 
11 Early examples of investment models with adjustment costs include Gould (1968) and 
Treadway (1969), Goulder and Summers (1989) is one of the earliest examples of capital 
adjustment costs in a CGE framework.  
12 See Dixon et al. (1988) for an example of a model with a fixed exogenous wage rate. 
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formulation still does not model a decision process and is not derived from theory, 
it does capture short run unemployment and the long run adjustment back to full 
employment.  The fourth and last method is to model a fully endogenous labor 
supply decision.  This formulation allows both wages and the level of 
employment to adjust to shocks.  However, full employment is assumed by the 
model clearing.  Furthermore, this formulation does not allow one to model 
realistic dynamic paths of employment, as the firm will make discrete jumps 
between employment levels in response to shocks.  This chapter introduces a new, 
fifth type of model, one that includes labor adjustment costs to model an 
endogenous labor supply decision and examine the trajectory of employment 
through time.         
Section 2-2 of this chapter presents the theoretical model.  It also describes 
in order the sectors of the model: sector A is the consumer goods sector; sector B 
is the capital services sector; sector C produces raw capital goods; sector D is the 
intermediate goods sector; and finally, a government sector that collects taxes and 
gives lump sum subsidies to the entire population.  All markets are competitive.  
This section also details the decisions of the workers in the model’s two types of 
jobs: workers with salaried jobs, or jobs requiring ‘firm-specific skills,’ are 
employed in sector A and receive a guaranteed base salary; workers with hourly 
jobs, or jobs requiring ‘general-skills,’ can work in all sectors, and firms do not 
incur adjustment costs when hiring them.  The last equations of the theoretical 
model are the market clearing conditions.  Section 2-3 then covers the 
implementation of the model.  The data and parameterization are covered in this 
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section, as is the construction of the steady state computational model.  The 
steady state model is programmed in Ox and is used to provide starting values for 
the intertemporal model, which is also presented in section 2-3.  The 
intertemporal model is programmed using GEMPACK and covers a 70-year time 
period.  The solution methods used for solving the intertemporal model are also 
presented here.  Procedures for testing the model are the last item covered in this 
section.  Section 2-4 presents simulation results, and section 2-5 concludes.  
 
2-2 THEORETICAL MODEL 
This chapter presents a sequence of short run general equilibrium models 
with four sectors, workers in two types of jobs, and both capital and labor 
adjustment costs.  The model is an extension of Wilcoxen (1989), which presents 
a small general equilibrium model incorporating investment with capital 
adjustment costs.  Intertemporally, the sequence of models is linked together by a 
model of both investment adjustment costs and a labor adjustment costs.  Sector A 
produces consumer goods (Qnet), sector B produces capital services (Kb), sector C 
produces raw capital goods (Xk), and sector D produces intermediate goods (Xm).  
The model includes a population of workers, which are divided into two groups: 
workers employed in salaried jobs, who have been trained with skills specific to 
sector A; and workers with hourly jobs, who possess general skills.  Only sector A 
employs workers in salaried jobs.  Sector A incurs adjustment costs when it hires 
or fires workers in salaried jobs, and when it changes the total number of workers 
in salaried jobs.  Workers with hourly jobs are employed in all sectors.  Hiring 
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hourly workers does not impose adjustment costs.  The model assumes full 
employment.  The model includes two types of capital, Ka, which is created by 
industry A’s investment and used exclusively in sector A, and Kb, which sector B 
creates with its investment and which it rents out to sectors C and D.  Finally, a 
government is included.  The government imposes taxes, gives lump sum 
subsidies to the entire population, and is constrained to balance its budget.  A 
graphical representation of the production side of the model is presented in 
Appendix 2.6.  
 
2-2-1 Sector A – Consumer Goods 
Industry A produces consumer goods using salaried labor, capital (Ka), 
and intermediate goods (Xma) as inputs.  Industry A’s capital (Ka) is created by its 
own investment and requires raw capital inputs (Xka) as well as hourly labor 
inputs (L2a) to install the capital.13  The firm’s salaried labor input depends on the 
number of workers it employs (N1), and the number of flextime hours each 
employee works (L1a).14  Each salaried employee must work 1L  hours per day, 
any additional hours worked count as flextime hours. 15  Workers in salaried jobs 
must choose a level of effort (F): 
                                                 
13 This specific division of labor between type-1 workers, who work in production, and type-2 
workers, who install capital, is useful for estimating the capital adjustment cost parameter. 
14 The flextime hours used in this model are not a literal overtime wage for salaried workers.  
Instead they are an approximation of a system of bonuses and comp-time normally used to reward 
salaried workers for working extra hours. 
15 The choice of a guaranteed 1L -hour workday plus flextime hours for salaried workers instead 
of a more standard eight-hour day and overtime hours allows for a number of guaranteed hours 
smaller than eight, thus we refer to additional hours worked (L1a) as ‘flextime’ hours instead of 
‘overtime’ hours.  The purpose of this construction is to eliminate the need for a non-negativity 
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2.1 F = 





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≤σ≤σ 10
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 . 
 
The total salaried labor input for the firm is thus N1( 1L +L1a)F.  As we will discuss 
later, sector A pays its salaried workers an efficiency wage premium that ensures 
the workers will choose to exert the high level of effort.  Since the salaried 
workers rationally choose F=1, the F is suppressed in the equations for sector A.  
A Cobb-Douglas functional form is used for production, so that the firm’s gross 
production function is: 
 
2.2 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) a3a2a1 amaa111aamaa111 XKLLNX,K,LLNf γγγ+ε=+  , 
 
where ∑γ
3
i
a
i  = 1 . 
 
                                                                                                                                     
constraint and multiple cases that would be involved if we used a standard eight-hour workday 
with overtime wages.  In order to model the overtime labor choice, a non-negativity constraint on 
overtime labor hours (L) would be required.  This introduces two cases into the model, L1a = 0 and 
L1a > 0.  If the firm is hit by a severe negative shock, they may want to reduce their output by 
more than is possible by simply reducing overtime hours.  The firm would then enter into the case 
where L1a = 0 and reduce its work force.  In order to avoid this possibility, we assign a value of 6 
to 1L .  With this specification, the firm can be expected to utilize several hours of flextime labor 
in the steady state.  If the firm is subjected to a negative shock, it has much more room to reduce 
output by reducing flextime labor without running into the constraint that flextime labor must be 
greater than or equal to zero.  In this way the multiple cases are not entirely eliminated; however, 
the model is formulated so the case where L1a = 0 is a remote enough possibility that we can 
ignore it for the vast majority of possible experiments.  Another way to deal with this issue is to 
interpret L1a < 0 as workers choosing to take unpaid leave. 
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The firm also faces labor adjustment cost, C(H1,N1), which is a function of 
the hiring rate of salaried workers per period (H1) and the number of salaried 
workers the firm currently employs (N1).  The labor adjustment cost is actually a 
quantity measure of lost output due to the adjustment of labor.  The firm loses 
some of its productivity when it diverts some of its resources to train new 
employees in the firm-specific skills required for the job, or when it restructures 
its organization to support a different total number of salaried employees.  In a 
general equilibrium model, labor adjustment costs cannot be simply inserted into 
a firm’s total cost equation.  The production function for adjustment costs must be 
specified.  If a firm pays a dollar-value adjustment cost, then some entity must 
receive those payments.  Labor adjustment costs in this model are produced with 
the same production function as the firm’s output.  Since the firm’s adjustment 
costs in this model are a quantity measure of lost output instead of a payment, 
there is no need to create an entity to collect the payments.  The firm’s gross 
output is simply its net output from above minus the adjustment costs. 
This firm’s decision in sector A is broken up into two portions, a within-
period decision, and an intertemporal choice.  Within each period, the firm’s 
capital stock and the number of workers it employs in salaried jobs are fixed.  
Thus, the firm minimizes costs within each period by choosing the level of 
flextime labor and the level of intermediate goods.  The labor adjustment costs 
will act as a fixed cost within each period, since salaried labor stock is fixed in the 
short run.  The capital adjustment costs are represented by a convex adjustment 
cost function, CIa(Ia).  These costs are also a short-run fixed cost since investment 
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decisions are made intertemporally.  The firm can adjust its capital stock and its 
number of salaried employees only in the intertemporal decision process, which is 
represented by an optimal control problem where the firm maximizes dividends it 
pays out. 
The firm’s within period cost minimization problem is: 
 
2.3 
a
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a
1 X,L
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Where W 1L  is the salary paid to workers trained with firm-specific skills.  
Salaried workers are compensated at a rate of WL1 for the additional flextime 
hours they work, and the price of intermediate goods is Pm.   
The resulting Lagrangian is: 
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where λasr is the Lagrangian multiplier in the short run (sr) for sector A.  The cost 
minimization provides the following first order conditions: 
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Solving the first order conditions for Xma results in: 
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Then, solving the first order conditions for N1L1a, the total amount of flextime 
labor the firm uses provides: 
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Next, we substitute equations 2.8 and 2.9 into total cost and solve for the firm’s 
marginal cost per unit of output: 
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Now impose the assumption that the price of output (P) is equal to marginal cost, 
and solve for net output: 
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Substituting gross output from equation 2.11 into equation 2.8, the factor demand 
for intermediate goods becomes: 
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By substituting gross output from equation 2.11 into equation 2.9, the factor 
demand for flextime labor becomes: 
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This completes the firm’s within-period problem.  Given the firm’s stock 
of capital and number of employees in salaried jobs, as well as the prices, the firm 
has factor demands for intermediate goods and flextime labor as given in 
equations 2.12 and 2.13.  The firm produces the amount of output shown in 
equation 2.11. 
Now that we know how the firm behaves within each period, we can turn 
our attention to the firm’s intertemporal decision.  The firm will use hiring and 
investment to change its labor and capital stocks intertemporally.  When the firm 
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changes its capital stock or hires additional salaried workers, it faces adjustment 
costs.  All new salaried workers the firm hires must be trained before they reach 
their productive potential, and if the firm changes the size of its workforce, then 
productivity will be reduced during the reorganization.  For capital adjustment 
costs, we first specify the firm’s investment-good production function.  We 
assume a Leontief production function, which requires the firm to purchase raw 
capital goods (Xka) and hire hourly labor (L2a) to install it.  The firm’s resulting 
investment-good production function is:   
 
2.14 ( )  θ= 21aa2aka L,XminI . 
 
Notice that the amount of hourly labor required in this sector is proportional to the 
square of the amount of raw capital -- this will result in convex internal 
adjustment costs.  In order for the firm to double investment, it would need to 
double its use of raw capital inputs and quadruple its use of hourly labor.  Next 
we minimize investment costs subject to the above production function and find: 
 
2.15 ( ) 21aa2aka LXI θ== . 
 
Solving for the firm’s raw capital and hourly labor demands we find: 
 
2.16 aak IX =  
 
 35 
and 
 
2.17 2aaa2 )I(L θ=  . 
 
We can now derive the firm’s investment cost function: 
 
2.18 ( ) 2aa2Laka )I(WIPIC θ+= . 
 
The firm’s intertemporal optimal control problem, with H1 and Ia as the 
control variables and N1 and Ka as the state variables, is to choose a time path for 
investment and hiring of salaried labor that maximizes dividends.  The optimal 
control problem can be written as: 
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where τd is the tax rate on dividends, δn1 is the exogenous quit rate of the salaried 
labor stock, and δka is the depreciation rate of the capital stock.  Substituting 
values for the factor demands and gross output from the firm’s within period 
optimization into 2.19, we can rewrite the problem as: 
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Now we can rewrite the firm’s problem as a Hamiltonian, h :  
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The firm’s optimization gives us the following first order conditions, 
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Since this is an infinite horizon problem, we can make a convenient 
transformation and define λi such that Λi = λie-rt, where Λi is the present value 
multiplier, and where λi is the current value multiplier.  The present value 
multiplier, Λi , is the change in value at time t = 0 from having an extra unit of 
capital or an extra salaried employee at time t.  The current value multiplier, λi , is 
the change in value in year t from a small change in the stock of capital or number 
of employees in year t.  Using this transformation and rearranging the first order 
conditions results in the following equations: 
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Equations 2.30 and 2.33 are the equations of motion for the number of 
salaried employees and the capital stock respectively.  Using the rearranged first 
order conditions, we can solve for the equations of motion for hiring and 
investment.  Given the differentiability of equations 2.28 and 2.31, the equations 
of motion are: 
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In order to do more with this model, we now must assume a functional 
form for the labor adjustment costs, C(H1,N1).  The literature on labor adjustment 
costs includes debates about several different possible functional forms.  
Hamermesh and Pfann (1996b) discuss the merits and drawbacks of several 
different functional forms used for labor adjustment costs.  In partial equilibrium 
models, the most prominent form for labor adjustment costs is symmetric convex 
(quadratic) costs.  This functional form has been used extensively because it 
provides a decent first order approximation and is simple to work with.  The 
imposition of symmetry, however, has never been highly regarded, as negative net 
employment changes have generally been found to be cheaper than positive net 
adjustments (Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996a).  Another approach to modeling 
labor adjustment costs is to use asymmetric convex adjustment costs.  Pfann and 
Verspagen (1989) proposed a form of asymmetric convex adjustment costs that 
has proven to be useful for estimation purposes.  Their functional form allows for 
the direction of the asymmetry to be estimated.  Unfortunately, this functional 
form is complex enough to make its use in our model prohibitively difficult.  
Another way of modeling adjustment costs is to introduce lumpy adjustment 
costs.  Hamermesh (1989) finds that the standard model of convex labor 
adjustment costs is inferior to a specification using lumpy adjustment costs in 
certain situations.  Lumpy adjustment costs require using multiple cases to model 
the decision process.  We have found that for programming purposes, including 
multiple cases in an intertemporal is not feasible when using the GEMPACK 
modeling package as we do in this chapter.  Another important factor in modeling 
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labor adjustment costs, emphasized by Hamermesh (1995), is the distinction 
between gross and net adjustment costs.  Gross labor adjustment costs arise when 
any worker is hired or fired.  Net adjustment costs, on the other hand, are incurred 
whenever the firm changes the total number of workers employed.  This 
distinction is potentially very important here, as one would expect to see gross 
adjustment costs occurring at all times if firms face regular turnover, while net 
adjustment costs would be zero in the steady state and only be incurred when the 
firm adjusts its stock of employees. 
This chapter uses the following convex labor adjustment cost function:  
 
2.36 ( ) 212211n1111 )H(NH)N,C(H α+δ−α=  . 
 
As Hamermesh (1995) encourages, this labor adjustment cost function contains 
both gross and net labor adjustment costs.  The α2 term captures gross adjustment 
costs, which are incurred whenever a salaried employee is hired or fired.  Net 
adjustment costs are incurred when the firm increases or decreases its stock of 
salaried employees.  These costs are captured by the α1 term.     
Turning back to our equations of motion, we can now use the partial 
derivatives of our adjustment cost function and substitute them into the equation 
of motion for hiring (2.34). This substitution results in the following rewritten 
equation of motion: 
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In Appendix 2.1, we show that both the capital and salaried labor systems 
in sector A are saddle path stable.  Knowing that the system has a unique saddle 
path allows us to use the transversality conditions – imposing that the model 
approaches the steady state in the long run – to provide the necessary end-point 
boundary conditions.   
We can now go back to the equations of motion and solve for the steady 
state values.  By setting the four equations of motion for H1 dot, N1 dot, Ia dot, 
and Ka dot (2.37, 2.30, 2.35 and 2.33 respectively) equal to zero, and solving the 
system of equations, we can find the unique steady state values of H1, N1, Ia, and 
Ka:  
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 This system of equations is best understood by looking at phase diagrams 
representing the firm’s investment and hiring practices.  Ideally, a single four 
dimensional phase diagram with H1, N1, Ia, and Ka axes could completely depict 
the model’s equations of motion.  Since H1 and N1, do not appear in the Ia and Ka 
equations of motion and vice versa, we can present two separate phase diagrams 
for simplicity.  Below is the firm’s H1-N1 phase diagram:16 
 
Figure 2.1 Phase Diagram for Hiring (H1) and Number of Salaried Jobs (N1) 
 
                                                 
16 The derivations of the model’s phase diagrams are shown in Appendix 2.2. 
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The saddle path depicts how the stock of salaried employees and the hiring rate 
evolve over time.  If the firm has too many salaried employees, then the hiring 
rate will be below the 0H1
.
=  isocline and the stock of salaried employees will be 
below the 0N1
.
=  isocline, thus both the hiring rate and the stock of salaried 
employees will decrease over time and move towards the steady state equilibrium.   
We can now use the phase diagrams to see how the firm responds to 
exogenous shocks in a partial equilibrium setting.  The phase diagram in Figure 
2.2 shows the results of an announced permanent decrease of the tax rate on W 
(wage rate implied by the salary W 1L ) for salaried workers.  The wage taxes in 
this model nominally fall on the workers, and thus do not appear in any equations 
for sector A; however, the economic incidence of the tax is on both workers and 
the firm.  For the purpose of the phase diagram experiment, we can represent the 
tax cut, ceteris paribus, as a reduction of the implied wage rate for salaried 
workers.  In this experiment, the tax on W is not intended to represent a statutory 
tax rate, since the tax on W and the tax on hourly wages do not differ.  Instead the 
decrease of the tax on W in this experiment is an explanatory device to see what 
happens when the taxes do differ (e.g. no taxes on fringe benefits for salaried 
workers). 
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Figure 2.2 The Effects of an Announced Decrease of τw 
 
In the phase diagram above, the firm begins at the steady state equilibrium shown 
by point a.  As soon as the announcement is made that there will be decrease in 
the tax rate on salaried employees, the firm increases the hiring rate and jumps to 
point b.  In the period between the announcement of the policy and the 
implementation of the policy, the firm’s hiring rate and stock of salaried 
employees evolves along a path dictated by the original isoclines.  This path is 
shown as the curve between point b and point c, where both the hiring rate and the 
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stock of employees are increasing.  When the new policy is actually implemented 
and the tax rate is lowered, the 0H1
.
=  isocline shifts up from ( 0H1
.
= )1 to 
( 0H1
.
= )2, and the evolution of the hiring rate and the salaried labor stock is 
governed by the new isoclines.  The firm optimally chooses a path such that as 
soon as the new policy is implemented, it finds itself on the new saddle path.  The 
firm’s hiring rate and number of salaried workers then follow the new saddle path 
towards the new steady state equilibrium.  This is shown as the movement 
between point c and point d in Figure 2.2.  The integral curves for the evolution of 
the state variable (N1), the control variable (H1), and the costate variable (λ1alr) are 
shown in Figure 2.3.  The integral curves say something about the speed of the 
adjustments shown in the phase diagram.  In Figure 2.3, the announcement 
corresponds to the jump from point a to point b in Figure 2.2.  As soon as the 
policy is announced, the firm increases its hiring rate and the costate variable has 
a discrete jump to higher level.  The implementation of the policy in Figure 2.3 
corresponds to point c in the phase diagram.  In the period between the 
announcement and implementation of the policy, both the control variable and the 
costate variable increase at an increasing rate.  The number of salaried workers 
employed by the firm begins to rise at an increasing rate after the announcement 
of the new policy.  When the new policy is actually implemented, the costate 
variable reaches its new steady state value.  In the phase diagram, Figure 2.2, the 
model approaches the new steady state along the new saddle path between point c 
and point d.  This happens over a long period of time and corresponds to the 
period after the implementation as time becomes very large in Figure 2.3.  The 
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hiring rate continues to rise after the implementation, but at a much slower rate as 
it approaches the new steady state.  The state variable’s integral curve goes 
through an inflection point when the policy is implemented, and increases at a 
decreasing rate as it approaches its new steady state value.   
 
Figure 2.3 Integral Curves for Announced Decrease of τw Experiment 
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This sort of experiment shows the importance of the intertemporal perspective.17  
If attention were limited to the steady state changes in the long run, a lot of 
important detail in how the steady state value is reached would be missed. 
Also of interest is the phase diagram governing the firm’s investment 
decision.  Figure 2.4 shows the firm’s Ia-Ka phase diagram. 
 
Figure 2.4 Phase Diagram for Investment (Ia) and Capital (Ka) 
 
                                                 
17 Appendix 2.3 shows the versatility of this type of partial equilibrium phase diagram analysis by 
showing the same experiment when the announced policy is only temporary. 
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This phase diagram shows that the 0Ia
.
=  isocline has a zero slope; therefore, if 
the capital stock is too small or large, the firm simply chooses the steady state 
level of investment and lets the capital stock grow or decay to the optimal size. 
 
2-2-2 Sector B – Capital Services 
Industry B produces capital services (Kb), all of which it rents out to 
sectors C and D at a price, ρ, which it takes as given.  As in sector A, all of the 
firm’s profits are paid out as dividends.  Capital services are produced by the 
firm’s own investment and require raw capital inputs (Xkb) as well as hourly labor 
inputs (L2b).  As with sector A, we need to specify the firm’s investment-good 
production function.  We again assume a Leontief production function:   
 
2.42 ( )  θ= 21bb2bkb L,XminI . 
 
As with investment in sector A, the amount of hourly labor required is 
proportional to the square of the amount of raw capital, this will again result in 
internal capital adjustment costs.  Next, minimize investment costs subject to the 
above production function to find: 
 
2.43  ( ) 21bb2bkb LXI θ== . 
 
Solving for the firm’s raw capital and hourly labor demands: 
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2.44 bbk IX =  
 
and 
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We can now write down the Hamiltonian corresponding to the firm’s 
maximization problem as: 
 
2.46 [ ] [ ]bkbblrbrtd2bb2Lbkb KIe)t1())I(WIP(K δ−Λ+−θ+−ρ= −h . 
 
Using the present value multiplier instead of the current value multiplier, the first 
order conditions resulting from the firm’s profit maximization are: 
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Equation 2.49 is the equation of motion for the capital stock, the equations of 
motion for investment is: 
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This system is shown to be saddle path stable in Appendix 2.1.  The steady state 
values for industry B’s investment and capital stock are: 
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Figure 2.5 shows the phase diagram for capital accumulation in sector B:18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Derivation of this phase diagram is shown in Appendix 2.2. 
 51 
Figure 2.5 Phase Diagram for Investment (Ib) and Capital (Kb) 
 
The phase diagram for capital accumulation in sector B is very similar to the Ia-Ka 
phase diagram for sector A. 
   
2-2-3 Sector C – Raw Capital 
Sector C produces the raw capital (Xk) used in sectors A and B for 
investment.  The inputs used in sector C include capital services (Kbc), which are 
rented from sector B at the price ρ, and hourly labor (L2c), which is paid the wage 
rate WL2.  Since industry C faces no labor adjustment costs and does not invest, it 
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does not have an intertemporal decision.  Sector C is a traditional sector that earns 
no short run profits.  Raw capital (Xk) is produced through a Cobb-Douglas 
production function: 
 
2.53 cc 1cbc2ck )K()L(X γ−γε= .      
 
The firm’s cost-minimization problem leads to the following factor demands: 
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The firm is constrained to earn zero profits: 
 
2.56 )1)(KLW(XP xkcbc22Lkk τ+ρ+=  , 
 
where τxk is a sales tax on raw capital goods and Pk is the purchaser’s price. 
 
2-2-4 Sector D – Intermediate Goods 
The intermediate goods (Xm), used in the production of consumer goods in 
sector A, are produced in sector D, which is structurally identical to sector C.  
Intermediate goods are produced according to the following Cobb-Douglas 
production function: 
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As with sector C, the firm’s cost-minimization problem leads to the following 
factor demands: 
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The firm is also constrained to earn zero profits: 
 
2.60 )1)(KLW(XP xmdbd22Lmm τ+ρ+=  , 
 
where τxm is a sales tax on intermediate goods and Pm is the purchaser’s price of 
intermediate goods. 
 
2-2-5 Consumers and Workers 
The population of this model (Pop) is divided into workers employed in 
two types of jobs: workers with salaried jobs are employed in sector A and are 
trained with firm-specific skills; and workers with hourly jobs, who possess 
general skills and can be employed in any sector.  Workers in salaried jobs can 
shirk and have a chance of not being caught.  If they choose to shirk, then they 
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receive slightly more utility than they would have from working hard.  A worker’s 
job is not a permanent characteristic.  Workers with hourly jobs can be hired by 
sector A and trained with firm specific skills to become salaried employees.  
Alternatively, salaried workers with firm specific skills can leave sector A to use 
their general skills as hourly workers in the other sectors.  This would happen if 
the salaried worker is caught shirking and is fired from the salaried job.  Workers 
are modeled as having identical Cobb-Douglas preferences between consumption 
and leisure.  The entire population owns equal shares of the two capital goods, so 
both types of workers receive equal shares of the dividend payments from sectors 
A and B.  Finally, both types of workers receive a subsidy payment from the 
government (S1 and S2). 
 
2-2-5-1 Workers with Salaried Jobs 
The utility maximization problem for salaried people is as follows: 
 
2.61 
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 s.t.  
=τ+ 1q Q)1(P Pop
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where U1 is utility, Q1 is consumption, J1 is leisure, F is the level of effort, E1 is 
the time endowment excluding the standard 1L  hours of work, Da and Db are 
gross dividend payments, τq is a sales tax on consumer goods, τw is an equivalent 
 55 
hourly wage tax on workers’ salaries, τL1 is the tax on additional flextime labor19, 
and τd is the dividend tax.  Utility depends on the level of effort chosen by the 
worker.  If the worker choose the high level of effort (F = 1), then g(1) = 1.  If the 
worker shirks (F = σ), then g(σ) > 1.20  We now define full income (Y1): 
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Performing the consumer’s maximization and utilizing the full income definition, 
we find the following demand equations for consumption and leisure: 
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Finally, salaried workers’ flextime labor supply is: 
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where L1s is a salaried worker’s flextime labor supply, that is the additional labor 
supply beyond the first 1L  salaried hours. 
 
                                                 
19 τL1 is set to zero in this model.  This is to represent the fact that the comp-time the flextime 
hours are designed to represent is generally untaxed.  If we interpret these as bonus payments 
instead of comp-time, then a positive value for τL1 may be desired. 
20 In this chapter we set g(σ) = 1.01. 
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2-2-5-2 Workers with Hourly Jobs 
Since a worker’s job is not a permanent characteristic, the preferences of 
the two types of workers are identical.  The only difference between the two types 
is their source of income.  For workers with hourly jobs, their utility 
maximization problem is: 
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The variables are defined similarly to those from the salaried worker problem.  
The exception is that for hourly workers, since they are not guaranteed any hours 
of work, E2 is their full time endowment and is thus equal to E1 plus 1L  additional 
hours.  Note that g(F) does not appear in the utility function for workers with 
hourly jobs.  This is because their effort level is perfectly observable and they are 
unable to shirk.  The full income definition also differs for workers with hourly 
jobs and is defined as: 
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The consumer’s utility maximization problem, along with the full income 
definition, provides the demand equations for consumption and leisure: 
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2.68 22q YQ)1(P µ=τ−  
2.69 222L2L Y)1(J)1(W µ−=τ−  
 
Also, the labor supply function for hourly workers is: 
 
2.70 
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where s2L  is an hourly worker’s labor supply. 
 
2-2-6 Government 
The government collects tax revenues and gives lump sum payments to 
the population.  Total government expenditures (G) are endogenous and are 
required to be equal to government revenues: 
 
 
2.71 =G 2s22L2L1s11L1L11w NLWNLWNLW τ+τ+τ  
              mmxmkkxk2211qbad XPXP)NQNQ(P)DD( τ+τ++τ++τ+ , 
 
where N2 is equal to the total population (Pop) less the number of salaried 
workers (N1).  Government expenditures are divided between the lump sum 
payments to the two types of workers: 
 
2.72 2211 NSNSG +=  . 
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Finally, we require that subsidy payments to all individuals be equal: 
 
2.73 21 SS = . 
 
This assumption could be changed for experiments involving unequal subsidies. 
 
2-2-7 Efficiency Wage Condition 
Sector A must pay its salaried workers an efficiency wage premium to 
ensure that they choose to exert a high level of effort.  If the salaried workers 
shirk: they are less productive for the firm; they receive a higher level of utility; 
and, they have a probability of being caught equal to ψ.  If they are caught 
shirking, then they loose their salaried job forever, and will instead find a job as 
an hourly worker.  In order to ensure that its workers exert a high level of effort, 
the firm simply needs to pay them enough so that their expected utility for 
working hard is equal to or higher than, but chosen to be equal to, their expected 
utility from shirking: 
 
2.74 [ ]∫∫ ∞ −µ−µµ−µ∞ −µ−µ ψ+σψ−=
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Solving the above integrals, we find the following condition:21 
                                                 
21 Note that if the probability of being caught (ψ) is one, then this condition simply states that the 
utility levels for workers in the two different jobs are equal. 
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This condition ensures that salaried workers will not shirk and risk losing their 
jobs.   
The last condition we need for this story is one that says that the firm is 
best responding by offering the efficiency wage premium.  This will be the case 
so long as σ is small enough that the profits the firm would receive from paying a 
normal salary and allowing salaried workers to shirk, are less than the profits the 
firm would receive from paying an efficiency wage premium and ensuring that 
salaried workers exert a high level of effort.  
 
2-2-8 Market Clearing Conditions 
Completing the model are a set of market clearing conditions for the 
consumption good, both types of labor, intermediate goods, raw capital, and 
capital services: 
 
2.76 2211net NQNQQ +=   
2.77 1s1 LL =  
2.78 d2c2b2a22s2 LLLLNL +++=  
2.79 amm XX =  
2.80 bkakk XXX +=  
2.81 dbcbb KKK +=  . 
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The model is now complete and we can turn to its implementation. 
 
2-3 IMPLEMENTATION  
2-3-1 Data and Parameterization 
In order to implement the model the variables are partitioned into 
endogenous and exogenous sets.22  Once the model has been partitioned, we must 
find values for the exogenous variables and the parameters of the model.23  Values 
for the exogenous variables are taken from a variety of sources.24  The capital 
depreciation rate parameters for sectors A and B (δa and δb) are set to 10%.  The 
exogenous quit rate (δn1) is set to 5% (Jaramillo et al., 1993).  Three data sets are 
used to estimate the parameters on the production side of the model.  The primary 
                                                 
22 See Table 2.6 for the list of exogenous variables and Table 2.7 for the list of endogenous 
variables. 
23 Most of the parameters of the model are estimated, however some are assumed.  It should also 
be noted that the choice of Cobb-Douglas functional forms imposes unitary elasticity of 
substitution, own-price elasticity equal to one, and cross-price elasticity equal to zero.  
24 The price of the consumption good is chosen to be the numeraire price and simply set to one.  
The required number of hours worked ( 1L ) is chosen to be six hours.  The time endowment for 
hourly workers (E2) is chosen to be 16 hours, thus the time endowment for salaried workers 
excluding required hours (E1) is 10 hours.  The interest rate (r) is chosen to be 5%.  The 
probability of a salaried worker being caught shirking (ψ) is set to 25%.  The utility multiplier for 
shirking (g(σ)) is chosen to be 1.01,.  The population (Pop) is taken from data on the total number 
of worker jobs form the US Department of Labor - Bureau of Labor Statistics - Special Purpose 
Files – Industry Employment and Output.  The tax on implied wages for salaried workers and the 
hourly wage tax, (τW, τL2) were set equal to the US average marginal federal income tax rate, and 
the dividend tax was set equal to the US average marginal federal income tax rate on dividends 
(Feenberg & Coutts, 1993).  The tax on flextime wages, τL1, was set equal to zero.  The sales tax 
(τS), tax on intermediate goods (τxm), and tax on raw capital (τxk) were simply set equal to 5%.               
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data set is Jorgenson’s 35-industry input-output (I-O) table (Jorgenson, 2003).25  
This data set provides most of the information needed to estimate the parameters 
of the model covering the years 1947 - 1985.  However, this I-O table only has 
information on one labor type.  Data on different labor types comes from the US 
Department of Labor - Bureau of Labor Statistics - Special Purpose Files – 
Industry Employment and Output.  This data set provides information for 192 
different industries on the number of jobs and total hours worked for three types 
of workers: production workers, wage & salary workers, and self-employed & 
unpaid family workers.  This data is available from the years 1958 – 2000; 
however it is very incomplete before the year 1975.  We still need information on 
wages to perform our estimations, so the US Department of Labor - Bureau of 
Labor Statistics - Current Employment Statistics are used as the final data set.  
The Current Employment Statistics have information of wages of production 
workers by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.26  This data set is also 
available from the years 1958 – 2000, and is rather incomplete before 1972. 
The first step in merging the three data sets is to merge the two BLS data 
sets on SIC code.  Once these two data sets are merged, they need to be 
aggregated up from the initial 192-order industries to the 35-order industries 
contained in the I-O table.  In order to perform this aggregation, a mapping 
between the 192-order industries of the BLS data set and the 35-order industries 
                                                 
25 Descriptions of the 35 industries along with a mapping to the 4 sectors of this model are 
presented in Table 2.3. 
26 The BLS Special Purpose Files – Industry Employment and Output provide an industry sector 
plan that maps their 192 industries into the corresponding SIC code 
(ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ep/ind.employment/sect281.txt).   
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of the I-O table must be created.  This mapping is presented in Table 2.2.  Once 
the mapping has been created, the number of jobs and total hours worked for the 
various labor types in each of the 35-order industries can be found by simple 
summation.  We create a price index for production workers’ wages in each of the 
35-order industries using divisia aggregation (Jorgenson and Griliches, 1971).  
Total hours and jobs for the three labor types and production worker wages can 
then be merged with the I-O table data set on 35-order industry. 
With the three data sets now merged, we need to aggregate up from 35 
industries to the 4 sectors of this model.  A mapping from the 35-order industries 
to the 4 sectors of this model is presented in Table 2.3.  Roughly, services and 
non-durable consumption goods are mapped to sector A, construction and all 
types of durable goods are mapped to sector C, and all other goods, mainly non-
consumption non-durables and services, are mapped to sector D.  No industries 
are mapped to sector B, this is because the capital services sector in this model 
simply nails down the raw capital produced in other sectors.  The values and 
quantities are aggregated by simple summation, and the prices and wages are 
aggregated by again using divisia aggregation to create price indicies (Jorgenson 
and Griliches, 1971).  Finally, two hiring variables are generated for production 
workers.  With data on the number of production worker jobs in successive 
periods, we create a variable for net hiring of production workers by simply 
subtracting the number of production worker jobs in the previous period from the 
number of production worker jobs in the current period.  With the assumption of a 
5% exogenous quit rate, the gross number of production workers hired in a period 
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is set equal to the total number of production worker jobs in the current period 
less 95% of the total number of production worker jobs in the previous period.  
The majority of the production parameters are estimated simultaneously 
using nonlinear least squares.  The first two parameters estimated in the 
simultaneous regression are γc and γd.  The technical change parameters for 
sectors C and D (εc and εd) are the next two parameters estimated in the 
simultaneous regression.  The investment parameter for sectors A, θa, is also 
estimated here.27  One of the Cobb-Douglas production parameters from sector A, 
γ3, and the ratio of γ1/γ3 are estimated in the simultaneous regression.28  The last 
parameter estimated here is the technical change parameter (εa) for sector A.  This 
simultaneous regression is preformed using the merged data set from 1975-1985. 
There are seven equations included in the simultaneous regression.  From 
the first order conditions of the profit maximization problems for sectors C and D, 
we can find the following expressions for γc and γd:29 
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27 In the mapping from the 35-order industries to the 4 sectors of the model, none of the 35-order 
industries are mapped to sector B.  Thus, θb is set equal to θa. 
28 From these two estimated parameters and the fact that γ1, γ2, and γ3 sum to one allows us to 
solve for all three Cobb-Douglas production parameters in sector A. 
29 For sectors B, C, and D all of the labor from the I-0 table is assumed to be hourly labor, the only 
type used by these sectors in the model. 
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Taking logs of the raw capital and intermediate goods production functions, we 
get the following equations: 
 
2.84 )Kln()1()Lln()ln()Xln( cbcc2cck γ−+γ+ε=  
2.85 )Kln()1()Lln()ln()Xln( dbdd2ddm γ−+γ+ε=  . 
 
From equation 2.15, we can solve for θa as a function of hourly labor and raw 
capital.30   
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From first order conditions of the firm’s within period cost minimization problem 
in sector A, we can find the ratio γ1/γ3: 
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Finally, taking the natural log of sector A’s gross production function and 
substituting in the ratio Γ, we find:31 
                                                 
30 Here we see that the specific division of salaried and hourly labor allows us to estimate sector 
A’s investment parameter. 
31 Finding sector A’s gross output (Qgross) requires an assumption about the size of the labor 
adjustment costs faced by sector A.  Jaramillo et al. (1993) find that marginal labor adjustment 
costs are approximately 2.3% of the annual wage per worker.  Using data on the wage earned by 
production workers, the number of hours worked by production workers, and the total number of 
production worker jobs, we create the annual wage per production worker.  Then, with our 
previously created hiring variable, we set total labor adjustment costs equal to the number of 
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2.88 ))LL(Nln()()ln()Qln( a1113agross +γΓ+ε=  
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The results of the nonlinear least squares simultaneous regression, along with all 
of the other regression results, are presented in Table 2.4. 
Next, we estimate the adjustment cost parameters (α1 and α2 from 
equation 2.36) by regressing the difference Qgross less Qnet on net hiring squared 
and gross hiring squared using OLS.32 
The final parameter to estimate is µ, the Cobb-Douglas preference 
parameter from the consumer’s utility function.  From equation 2.63, µ can be 
shown to be equal to the ratio of consumption expenditures over full income.  The 
data sets used to estimate µ comes from several different sources.  Data on 
personal consumption expenditures comes from the US Department of Commerce 
- Bureau of Economic Analysis - National Income and Product Accounts Tables - 
Table 1.1 – Gross Domestic Product.  Personal consumption expenditures are 
converted to per capita number using a data set from the US Census Bureau.  To 
compute full income, a data set on hourly wages from the US Department of 
Labor – Bureau of Labor Statistics - Current Employment Statistics is used, along 
                                                                                                                                     
workers hired times 2.3% of the annual wage per worker.  Dividing by the price of the consumer 
good, labor adjustment costs are converted into a quantity measure of lost output.  This is then 
added to the observed output of sector A to create a measure of gross output  (Qgross). 
 
32 The estimation of the α1 and α2 parameters was excluded from the simultaneous nonlinear least 
squares estimation of the other production parameters in order to facilitate convergence of the 
nonlinear least squares regression. 
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with data on personal dividend income and transfer payments to persons from US 
Department of Commerce - Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and 
Product Accounts Tables - Table 2.8 – Personal Income by Type of Income.  To 
create full income, hourly wages are multiplied by the full time endowment (16 
hours), and then by 250 (five workdays per week, fifty workweeks per year).  The 
result is added to the sum of per capita transfer payments and per capita dividend 
income.  The Cobb-Douglas preference parameter, µ, is then estimated by 
regressing the ratio of per capita consumption expenditures to full income on a 
constant, using OLS.33  
 
2-3-2 Steady State Computational Model 
In order to implement the computational version of this model, we need to 
find the steady state equilibrium, which will be used for initial starting values for 
the intertemporal model.  For this purpose, we created an Ox program to solve for 
the model’s steady state equilibrium.  We use Newton’s method to solve the 
model, therefore the equations of the model are entered in the form LHS – RHS in 
order to calculate miss distances.  The complete list of the steady state 
computational models equations is presented in Appendix 2.4. 
The steady state values found by the OX program are reported in Table 
2.7.  These values will serve as starting point values for the intertemporal model.  
The next section implements and performs simulations with the intertemporal 
                                                 
33 Results for the µ estimation are presented in Table 2.4. 
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model to see how it behaves and to gain some insight on how labor adjustment 
costs affect the results.   
 
2-3-3 Intertemporal Computational Model 
We implement the intertemporal model in GEMPACK.  The first step of 
this implementation is to define the time period the model is to cover.  This model 
covers 70 years with thirteen intervals of varying length defined by a vector of 
years, year(0) … year(13).34  The unequal spacing allows us to capture the quick 
changes that occur immediately after the shock, without the burden of computing 
annual changes throughout the transition to the steady state. 
With our time periods defined, we can now specify the equations of the 
intertemporal model.  The model has three sets of equations defined over different 
subsets of the vector of years.  All of the equations from the steady state model in 
Appendix 2.4, excluding the equations of motion set equal to zero, are repeated in 
the intertemporal model and defined over the entire time period.  The equations of 
motion constitute the dynamic equations of the model.  These equations are 
defined over all but the initial time period, year(0).  The dynamic equations of the 
model are converted into their finite difference equivalents:   
 
2.89 ( ))t(N)t(H)t(j)t(N)1t(N 11n111 δ−⋅+=+ , 
 
                                                 
34 The years used to define the intervals in this implementation of the model are, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2015, 2020, 2030, 2040, 2055, and 2070. 
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where j(t) is equal to year(t+1) - year(t), 
 
2.90 ( ))t(K)t(I)t(j)t(K)1t(K akaaaa δ−+=+  
 
2.91 )t(H)1t(H 11 =+  
           
( ) ( )[ ] ( )
)(
)t(W)t(W
)t(P2
L)t(H)t(N)t(Hr
)t(j
21
1L
1
1211n111n
α+α
−+α+δ−αδ+
⋅+  
 
2.92 ( )[ ])t(I)t(W2)t(Pr[
)t(W2
1)t(j)t(I)1t(I aa2Lkk
a2L
aa θ+δ+θ
⋅+=+  
     ( ) a2
a
3
a
2
a
1
a
2 )t(P)t(W
)t(P
m
a
3
1L
a
1
1
a2
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ 


 γ



 γ
εγ− ] 
2.93 ( ))t(K)t(I)t(j)t(K)1t(K bkbb
.
bb δ−⋅+=+  
 
2.94 ( )
b2L
bb2Lkkb
bb )t(W2
)t()t(I)t(W)t(P)r()t(j)t(I)1t(I
θ
ρ−θ+δ+
⋅+=+ , 
 
The final set of equations in the intertemporal model includes the six boundary 
conditions, defined only for the first or last element of the vector of years.  The 
first three boundary conditions are starting point boundary conditions comprised 
of the initial capital stock for sector A, Ka(0), the initial number of salaried 
workers in sector A, N1(0), and the initial capital stock in sector B, Kb(0).  The 
other three boundary conditions require that the state variables be equal to their 
steady state values at the last time period.  Therefore the following three equations 
hold only in the last period: 
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In order to solve the model, GEMPACK linearizes the equations of the 
model using Johansen’s method (Harrison and Pearson, 1994).  After the 
equations are linearized, the model is set up as a system of linear equations in the 
form: 
 
2.98 0xZ = , 
 
where Z is matrix with rows corresponding to the equations of the model and 
columns corresponding to the model’s variables, and x  is a vector of variables.  
The Z matrix is then partitioned into an endogenous and an exogenous portion: 
 
2.99 0xzxzxZ x2e1 =+= , 
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where z1 is a square matrix with rows again corresponding to the equations of the 
model and columns corresponding to the endogenous variables and z2 has the 
same number of rows and has columns corresponding to the exogenous variables 
of the model.  The vector ex  consists of the model’s endogenous variables and 
xx  is a vector of exogenous variables, which includes the shocked variables and 
thus defines the experiment.  From the above equation (2.99) we know that 
x2e1 xzxz −= .  We can simply compute x2 xz−  in GEMPACK and then solve 
for ex  by elimination.   
In order to reduce the truncation error associated with linearization, 
Gragg’s two-step method is used for running simulations (Harrison and Pearson, 
1994).  Instead of simply solving the linearized model with the entire shock, 
Gragg’s two-step method divides the shock into two equal smaller shocks.  The 
first step considers just the first of the smaller shocks and then the derivatives are 
recalculated.  In the second step, Gragg’s method returns to the starting point and 
uses the derivatives calculated after the first step to find the effect of the entire 
shock. 
 
2-3-4 Testing The Model 
In order to test the complete model, several experiments are run to check 
that the model is programmed correctly.  The first test is to verify that the model 
satisfies Walras’ law.  In order to perform this test, we created new variable (wal) 
and equated it to the left hand side minus the right hand side of the dropped 
market clearing condition.  In both the steady state OX version of the model and 
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the dynamic GEMPACK version, the model satisfies Walras’ law.  Our second 
test of the model is to verify that the model is homogeneous of degree 1 in prices.  
We ran an experiment increasing the numeraire price (P) by 50%.  The effect of 
this experiment should be to increase all nominal variables by 50% and leave all 
real variable unchanged.  The model does in fact produce the expected result, 
which indicates that the model does not include major programming errors. 
 
2-4 RESULTS 
The next step is to run simulations with the full intertemporal model.  This 
section reports results from two different simulations.  The first simulation is an 
announced reduction of the tax rate on implied hourly wages for salaried workers 
(τw).  This simulation is comparable to the partial equilibrium phase diagram 
experiments in section II.A.  The second simulation is an announced increase of 
the tax rate on intermediate goods.  This simulation can be thought of as an 
environmental policy designed to reduce the usage of a polluting input. 
 
2-4-1 Reduction of tw Simulation 
The simulation results reported in this section are for an announced 
reduction of the τw, the tax rate on W, from 25.7% to 5.7%.  The policy is 
announced in the year 2000 (period 0) and is implemented in the year 2003 
(period 3).  This simulation is equivalent to the partial equilibrium experiment in 
section 2.2.1.  As with the partial equilibrium experiment, this simulation is 
stylized as it is primarily designed to demonstrate the behavior of this model.  
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Furthermore, this simulation allows for comparisons between the general 
equilibrium and partial equilibrium results.   
The first interesting result of the intertemporal general equilibrium 
simulation is the time path for H1, the hiring of salaried workers in sector A, 
shown in Chart 2.1. 
 
Chart 2.1 H1 – Hiring Rate of Salaried Workers in Sector A 
 
The first striking feature of the time path for H1 is its difference from Figure 2.3, 
the integral curve for the hiring rate in the partial equilibrium experiment.  In both 
versions of the experiment, the hiring rate experiences an initial discrete jump 
when the policy is announced.  In the partial equilibrium experiment, the hiring 
rate then continues to grow as it approaches the steady state asymptotically from 
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below, with a sharp reduction in the rate of growth when the policy is 
implemented.  The hiring rate follows a very different trajectory in the general 
equilibrium version.  The hiring rate of salaried workers continues to rise initially 
after the policy announcement, but falls when the policy is implemented.  The 
hiring rate continues to decrease and approaches the new steady state 
asymptotically from above.  It is immediately apparent that general equilibrium 
considerations have an impact on the time path of H1. 
Understanding why the time path of H1 in this simulation is so different 
from the partial equilibrium version will aid the understanding of this model’s 
behavior.  The first step in tracing the source of this difference is to look at the 
time path of N1, the number of salaried workers employed in sector A. 
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Chart 2.2 N1 – Number of Salaried Workers in Sector A 
 
These results for N1 look very similar to the partial equilibrium integral curve.  As 
with the partial equilibrium integral curve, Chart 2.2 shows N1 increasing at a 
slightly increasing rate after the announcement of the new policy, and a barely 
perceptible inflection point in year 2004 after the new policy is implemented.  
After the implementation of the new policy, the number of salaried workers 
increases at a decreasing rate as it approaches its new steady state value. 
For the firm in sector A, a reduction in τw has several long run 
implications.  As a result of the new policy, the firm wants to produce more, and 
thus demands more inputs.  Since the firm faces lower costs per salaried worker 
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due to the decrease in τw, it wants to have a larger number of salaried workers, 
and utilize fewer flextime hours per worker.  Thus, the dynamic path to the new 
steady state is influenced by the adjustment costs it faces when changing its 
stocks of capital and salaried workers. 
As soon as the new policy is announced, the firm knows it would like to 
produce more output.  Since it is unable immediately to increase the amount of 
capital or the number of workers it uses, the first response is to increase its use of 
intermediate goods. 
 
Chart 2.3 Xma – Intermediate Goods Used in Sector A 
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Chart 2.3 shows the firm’s initial increase in intermediate goods used in 
production, and its path to the new steady state using slightly more intermediate 
goods.  In  
Chart 2.4 we see the firms increased use of capital over time. 
 
Chart 2.4 Ka – Sector A Capital Used in Production 
 
 
To complete the picture of the firm’s inputs,  
Chart 2.5 shows how the firm’s use of flextime hours per worker changes as more 
workers are hired.  At first there is a slight increase in flextime labor, since the 
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firm cannot immediately increase the number of workers.  After the initial small 
increase, which may or may not be significant, the use of flextime labor declines 
to its new steady state value. 
 
Chart 2.5 L1a – Flextime Hours Used in Sector A per Salaried Worker 
 
 
The dynamic path of the firm’s output is shown in Chart 2.6.  The initial fall in 
output is due to the adjustment costs incurred by the firm as it increases its 
number of salaried employees.  As the firm goes through the adjustment process, 
the output increases to its new steady state level.
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Chart 2.6 Qnet – Sector A Net Output of Consumer Goods 
 
 
One of the keys to understanding why time paths of the control and state 
variables appear so different in the partial and general equilibrium versions of this 
experiment is the way the firm’s decreased use of flextime hours (L1a) affects the 
flextime wage rate (WL1). 
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Chart 2.7 WL1 – Salaried Worker Flextime Wage Rate 
 
 
Chart 2.7 shows that as the firm hires more workers and its demand for flextime 
hours falls, the equilibrium flextime wage rate falls as well.   
The final source of the difference between the dynamic paths from the 
partial equilibrium experiment and the general equilibrium simulation is the 
implied hourly wage rate for salaried workers (W), which was subjected to the tax 
decrease.   
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Chart 2.8 W – Salaried Worker Implied Hourly Wage Rate 
 
 
Chart 2.8 shows that W drops quite dramatically when the policy is implemented 
and then rebounds.  The implied hourly wage rate for salaried workers paid by 
sector A is expected to fall when τw is decreased.  The other rebound visible in 
Chart 2.8 is due to the efficiency wage condition.  As Chart 2.2 shows, the 
number of salaried workers is increasing, so conversely the number of hourly 
workers is decreasing.  With fewer hourly workers, the wage rate for hourly 
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workers increases.  As the wage rate for hourly workers increases, salaried 
workers need to be paid more in order to ensure they choose not to shirk. 
The dynamic paths of W and WL1 have important implications for the 
dynamic paths of H1 and N1.  Equation 2.116 from Appendix 2.2, reproduced 
below as equation 2.100, describes the 0H1
.
=  isocline. 
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In the partial equilibrium analysis, WL1 was assumed to be constant, whereas 
Chart 2.7 shows that it is clearly not constant in the general equilibrium 
simulation.  Furthermore, the partial equilibrium analysis assumed W decreased in 
a single step.  The general equilibrium simulation shows that W rebounds after the 
initial decrease.  The implication is that as time passes, since WL1 is decreasing 
and W rebounds, the H1 intercept of the 0H1
.
=  isocline is decreasing.  The phase 
diagram from the partial equilibrium experiment does not capture everything that 
was actually happening.  To describe fully what happens as a result of an 
announced reduction of τw, a phase diagram experiment needs to include in 
addition to an announced reduction of τw, a series of small anticipated negative 
shocks to WL1, and a later small anticipated positive shock to W.  Figure 2.6 
shows an approximation of this result with fall of WL1 and rebound of W 
occurring in a single anticipated shock instead of in a series of small shocks.35   
                                                 
35 This example is consistent with the model’s assumptions about firms having perfect foresight. 
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Figure 2.6 Revised Effects of an Announced Decrease of τw 
 
In this diagram, the firm begins at point a, the initial steady state.  When the new 
policy is announced, the firm immediately increases its hiring rate and jumps 
from point a to point b.36 In the period between the announcement of the 
implementation of the policy, the firm’s hiring rate and stock of salaried 
                                                 
36 The firm’s initial increase in its hiring rate accounts for its anticipation of the new policy and its 
anticipation of the subsequent shocks to WL1 and W.  Since the firm has perfect foresight and 
anticipates the subsequent shocks, it will evolve towards the eventual steady sate without any 
further discrete jumps in its hiring rate.   
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employees follows the path from point b to point c as governed by the ( 0H1
.
= )1 
isocline.  When the policy is implemented, the firm begins to evolve from point c 
through point d to point e, along a curve governed by the ( 0H1
.
= )2 isocline.  At 
point d, the curve crosses the 0N1
.
=  isocline, and the number of workers begins 
to decrease.  Then at point e, the firm is hit by the anticipated shocks reducing the 
flextime wage rate (WL1) and a slight rebound of the implied wage rate for 
salaried workers (W).  At this point the firm finds itself on the saddle path 
governed by the ( 0H1
.
= )3 isocline, evolving towards the new steady state.  Figure 
2.7 shows the integral curves for this experiment. 
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Figure 2.7 Integral Curves for Revised τw Experiment  
 
These integral curves show agreement with Chart 2.1 and Chart 2.2.  As with the 
computational experiment, the integral curve for H1 approaches the steady state 
value from above.  Furthermore, in both versions, H1 peaks when the policy is 
implemented and N1 reaches a peak several years later.  Extending this type of 
analysis to include a series of small shocks to WL1 and W instead of a single 
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shock, we would expect the integral curves to appear much like the results from 
the computational experiment. 
 
2-4-2 Increase of the Tax Rate on Intermediate Goods (τxm) Simulation 
The second simulation in this chapter corresponds to a policy designed to 
discourage the use of intermediate goods.  Such a policy may be desirable if 
production or use of the intermediate good is associated with a negative 
environmental externality.  This experiment can be thought of as an energy tax.  
The specific simulation is an increase of the tax rate on intermediate goods (τxm) 
from 5% to 15%.37  The policy is announced in the year 2000 (period 0) and is 
implemented in the year 2003 (period 3).  A few of the interesting results from 
this simulation are presented in this section.  First, Chart 2.9 shows how the 
announced increase of the tax rate on intermediate goods affects the usage of 
intermediate goods in sector A.  The use of intermediate goods remains stable 
after the tax increase is announced, and then falls when the tax increase goes into 
effect. 
 
                                                 
37 These numbers are not associated with an actual policy, as existing taxes on intermediate goods 
are very low.  The simulation is simply intended to demonstrate the behavior of the model.  
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Chart 2.9 Xma – Intermediate Goods Used in Sector A 
 
 
Due to the increased tax rate on intermediate goods, costs for sector A have 
increased, so the price increases, and the demand decreases.  Thus, sector A 
produces less using relatively fewer intermediate goods and relatively more labor 
and capital.  
Chart 2.10 shows the reduction in output due to the increase of the tax rate 
on intermediate goods (τxm). 
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Chart 2.10 Qnet – Output of Sector A 
 
 
Output remains largely unchanged when the policy is announced, and then falls 
dramatically when the tax increase goes into effect. 
Chart 2.11 shows how investment in sector A is affected by the new 
policy. 
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Chart 2.11 Ia – Investment in Sector A 
 
 
Investment in sector A increases immediately when the new policy is announced.  
After quickly reaching a high level, investment falls back to the level needed to 
sustain the new larger capital stock.   
The evolution of the capital stock is shown in Chart 2.12. 
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Chart 2.12 Ka – Capital Stock in Sector A 
 
 
Chart 2.13 now shows how the hiring rate of salaried workers in sector A 
is affected by the new policy. 
 
 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080
year
%
 c
ha
ng
e
 90 
Chart 2.13 H1 – Hiring Rate of Salaried Workers in Sector A 
 
 
The hiring rate of salaried workers falls when the new policy is announced, and 
then falls further until the policy takes effect.  Once the policy is in effect, the 
hiring rate falls slightly before rebounding towards the new steady state level. 
Finally the actual number of salaried workers in sector A is shown in 
Chart 2.14. 
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Chart 2.14 N1 – Number of Salaried Workers in Sector A 
 
 
The number of salaried employees falls to the new steady state value.  While the 
number of salaried employees decreases, due to the reduced output, the reduction 
is smaller than that for intermediate goods. 
The results presented here are a small sample of the output of this 
simulation.  The results give a feel for how a shock to one component of the 
system can have repercussions throughout the system.  Furthermore, the time 
paths of the variables are shown explicitly.  This allows one to examine the full 
intertemporal impact of the policy. 
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In order to judge the desirability of a policy, or compare two different 
polices, we need to calculate the equivalent variation, which is simply the amount 
of additional expenditures needed to achieve the new utility level at the old prices.  
For this model, we need to consider how the policy affects the entire time path of 
future expenditures.  The expression for the intertemporal equivalent variation is: 
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where N11(t) is the number of salaried workers in period t who were also salaried 
workers in period 0, N21(t) is the number of salaried workers in period t who were 
hourly workers in period 0, N12(t) is the number of hourly workers in period t who 
were salaried workers in period 0, and N22(t) is the number of hourly workers in 
period t who were also hourly workers in period 0.  This accounting is needed to 
keep track of each worker’s prices in the initial period, and utility in the current 
period.  Using the discrete data from the simulation, we can approximate the 
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equivalent variation resulting from the increase of the tax on intermediate goods 
(τxm).   
 
Table 2.1 Equivalent Variation 
EV G Old G New  G Change MCPF 
-1.92E+07 1.95E+09 1.98E+09 3.50E+07 1.55 
 
The equivalent variation resulting from the increase of the tax rate on intermediate 
goods (τxm) is approximately negative $19 million.  To put this number into 
context, the present value of the total future government expenditures in this 
model are on the order of $1.9 billion, and the present value of the additional 
revenue generated by the tax increase is approximately $35 million.38  This 
implies that for this tax increase, every dollar of additional revenue generated 
costs approximately $1.55.39     
 
2-4-3 Temporary Increase of the Tax on Consumer Goods (τs) Simulation 
 The last simulation differs from the first two in that it does not use the 
estimated values for the labor adjustment cost parameters (α1 and α2).  Instead 
this simulation is run twice, once with low values for the labor adjustment cost 
                                                 
38 The value for total government expenditures is small due to the incomplete tax structure. 
39 For a small increase in the tax rate this would be the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). 
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parameters, and once with high values for the labor adjustment cost parameters.40  
This allows us to see the impact of labor adjustment costs.  The policy simulated 
here is an immediate temporary increase of the tax on consumer goods (τs) from 
5% to 25%.  The policy goes into effect in the year 2000 as soon as it is 
announced, and lasts until 2003.  In 2004 the tax rate on consumer goods returns 
to its initial level.  The effects of this policy on the firm’s hiring of workers into 
salaried jobs is shown in Chart 2.15: 
 
Chart 2.15 H1 – Hiring Rate of Salaried Workers – High & Low Labor 
Adjustment Costs  
                                                 
40 The low labor adjustment cost simulation sets α1 = α2 = .005, and the high labor adjustment 
cost simulation sets α1 = α2 = .233. 
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Here we see that the hiring rate of workers into salaried jobs changes much more 
dramatically when adjustment costs are low than when they are high.  When 
adjustment costs are low, the firm reduces the number of salaried jobs more 
quickly when the policy is announced, and hires workers back into salaried jobs 
more quickly once the tax returns to normal.  C shows the effects of the policy on 
the number of salaried jobs: 
 
Chart 2.16 N1 – Number of Salaried Jobs – High & Low Labor Adjustment 
Costs 
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This chart dramatically demonstrates the importance of labor adjustment costs.  
Even a temporary policy or shock that effects a particular industry can have long 
lasting effects on the number of workers in that industry.  Capturing the 
magnitude and duration of these effects requires that we include labor adjustment 
costs in our models.  This is particularly important when modeling environmental 
policies that strongly impact a narrow portion of the economy.  These policies 
have the potential to strongly impact the number of jobs in the affected industries.  
Accurately describing the desirability of such a policy requires a model that has 
the ability to capture both the general equilibrium effects of the policy, and the 
transitional dynamics driven by labor adjustment costs. 
 
2-5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has introduced a method for including labor adjustment costs 
in an intertemporal computable general equilibrium model.  The simulations 
presented in this chapter provide a feel for how this model behaves.  They 
demonstrate the importance of considering labor adjustment costs when 
considering potential policy proposals.  Furthermore, the simulations presented in 
this chapter clearly show the importance of considering labor adjustment costs in 
a general equilibrium setting.  Policy makers need to consider not only the long-
term effects of their proposals, but also the transitional effects.  A model such as 
this one is needed to take these effects into account.  The inclusion of adjustment 
costs and the calculation of equivalent variations for the entire time path, allows 
an accurate picture of the true cost of a policy to be obtained. 
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The possibilities for extending this research are numerous.  One important 
extension is to include labor adjustment costs in all sectors.  This would allow the 
model to capture labor adjustment costs involved with workers changing types of 
jobs, or adjustment costs associated with workers staying in the same type of job 
and changing industries.  Another extension, including labor adjustment costs for 
the labor used to install capital, could reveal some important interactions between 
the capital and labor adjustment costs.  It is also possible to add an education 
decision to the model.  This type of model could potentially have populations of 
people with different abilities who choose what type of job to train for with their 
education decision.  Different job categories could then be added to the model.  
With an education decision in the model, it is possible that workers could bear 
some of the adjustment costs involved with change careers.  It may also be 
possible to include unemployment in this type of model.  All of these features 
could also be added to a larger scale computable general equilibrium model of the 
U.S. economy.  The labor adjustment costs introduced into an intertemporal 
computable general equilibrium model have great potential for enriching CGE 
models by allowing them to accurately capture transition costs. 
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Tables 
Table 2.2 192-Order Industries and Mapping to 35-Order Industries 
192-0RDER 
INDUSTRY 
NUMBER 
DESCRIPTION 
35-ORDER 
INDUSTRY 
NUMBER 
STANDARD 
INDUSTRIAL 
CALSSIFICATION 
(SIC) 1987 
 
 
 
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries 
1 Agricultural production 1 01,02 
2 Veterinary services   1 74 
3 Landscape and horticultural services 1 78 
4 Agric., forestry and fisheries services, nec. 1 07 (excl. 074&078) 
5 Forestry, fishing, hunting, & trapping 1 08,09 
 
 
 
Mining 
6 Metal mining 2 10 
7 Coal mining 3 12 
8 Crude petroleum, natural gas, and gas liquids 4 131,132 
9 Oil and gas field services 4 138 
10 Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 5 14 
 
 
 
Construction 
11 Construction 6 15,16,17 
 
 
 
Manufacturing 
12 Logging 11 241 
13 Sawmills and planing mills 11 242 
14 Millwork, plywood, and structural members 11 243 
15 Wood containers and misc. wood products 11 244,249 
16 Wood buildings and mobile homes 11 245 
17 Household furniture 12 251 
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18 Partitions and fixtures 12 254 
19 Office and misc. furniture and fixtures 12 252,253,259 
20 Glass and glass products 19 321,322,323 
21 Hydraulic cement 19 324 
22 Stone, clay, and misc. mineral products 19 325,326,328,329 
23 Concrete, gypsum, & plaster products 19 327 
24 Blast furnaces and basic steel products 20 331 
25 Iron and steel foundries 20 332 
26 Primary nonferrous smelting & refining 20 333 
27 All other primary metals 20 334,339 
28 Nonferrous rolling and drawing 20 335 
29 Nonferrous foundries 20 336 
30 Metal cans and shipping containers 21 341 
31 Cutlery, hand tools, and hardware 21 342 
32 Plumbing and nonelectric heating equipment 21 343 
33 Fabricated structural metal products 21 344 
34 Screw machine products, bolts, rivets, etc. 21 345 
35 Metal forgings and stampings 21 346 
36 Metal coating, engraving, and allied services 21 347 
37 Ordnance and ammunition 25 348 
38 Miscellaneous fabricated metal products 21 349 
39 Engines and turbines 22 351 
40 Farm and garden machinery and equipment 22 352 
41 Construction and related machinery 22 353 
42 Metalworking machinery and equipment 22 354 
43 Special industry machinery 22 355 
44 General industrial machinery and equipment 22 356 
45 Computer and office equipment 23 357 
46 Refrigeration and service industry machinery 23 358 
47 Industrial machinery, nec. 22 359 
48 Electric distribution equipment 23 361 
49 Electrical industrial apparatus 23 362 
50 Household appliances 23 363 
51 Electric lighting and wiring equipment 23 364 
52 Household audio and video equipment 23 365 
53 Communications equipment 23 366 
54 Electronic components and accessories 23 367 
55 Miscellaneous electrical equipment 23 369 
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56 Motor vehicles and equipment 24 371 
57 Aerospace 23 372,376 
58 Ship and boat building and repairing 25 373 
59 Railroad equipment 25 374 
60 Miscellaneous transportation equipment 25 375,379 
61 Search and navigation equipment 26 381 
62 Measuring and controlling devices 26 382 
63 Medical equip., instruments, and supplies 26 384 
64 Ophthalmic goods 26 385 
65 Photographic equipment and supplies 26 386 
66 Watches, clocks, and parts 26 387 
67 Jewelry, silverware, and plated ware 27 391 
68 Toys and sporting goods 27 394 
69 Manufactured products, nec. 27 393,395,396,399 
70 Meat products 7 201 
71 Dairy products 7 202 
72 Preserved fruits and vegetables 7 203 
73 Grain mill products and fats and oils 7 204,207 
74 Bakery products 7 205 
75 Sugar and confectionery products 7 206 
76 Beverages 7 208 
77 Miscellaneous food and kindred products 7 209 
78 Tobacco products 8 21 
79 Weaving, finishing, yarn, and thread mills 9 221-224,226,228 
80 Knitting mills 9 225 
81 Carpets and rugs 9 227 
82 Miscellaneous textile goods 9 229 
83 Apparel 10 231-238 
84 Miscellaneous fabricated textile products 10 239 
85 Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills 13 261-263 
86 Paperboard containers and boxes 13 265 
87 Converted paper products except containers 13 267 
88 Newspapers 14 271 
89 Periodicals 14 272 
90 Books 14 273 
91 Miscellaneous publishing 14 274 
92 Commercial printing and business forms 14 275,276 
93 Greeting cards 14 277 
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94 Blankbooks and bookbinding 14 278 
95 Service industries for the printing trade 14 279 
96 Industrial chemicals 15 281,286 
97 Plastics materials and synthetics 17 282 
98 Drugs 15 283 
99 Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods 15 284 
100 Paints and allied products 15 285 
101 Agricultural chemicals 15 287 
102 Miscellaneous chemical products 15 289 
103 Petroleum refining 16 291 
104 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 16 295,299 
105 Tires and inner tubes 17 301 
106 Rubber products, plastic hose, and footwear 17 302,305,306 
107 Miscellaneous plastics products, nec. 17 308 
108 Footwear, except rubber and plastic 18 313,314 
109 Luggage, handbags, leather products, nec. 18 311,315-317,319 
 
 
 
Transportation 
110 Railroad transportation 28 40 
111 Local and interurban passenger transit 28 41 
112 Trucking and courier services except air 28 421,423 
113 Warehousing and storage 28 422 
114 Water transportation 28 44 
115 Air transportation 28 45 
116 Pipelines, except natural gas 28 46 
117 Passenger transportation arrangement 28 472 
118 Miscellaneous transportation services 28 473,474,478 
 
 
 
Communications 
119 Telephone & telegraph communications and 
communications services, nec. 
29 481-2,489 
120 Cable and pay television services 29 484 
121 Radio and TV Broadcasting 29 483 
 
 
 
Utilities 
 102 
122 Electric utilities 30 491 
123 Gas utilities 31 492 
124 Combined Utilities 30 493 
125 Water and sanitation 31 494-497 
 
 
 
Trade 
126 Wholesale trade 32 50,51 
127 Retail trade exc. eating and drinking places 32 52-57,59 
128 Eating and drinking places 32 58 
 
 
 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
129 Depository institutions 33 60 
130 Nondepository; holding & investment offices 33 61,67 
131 Security and commodity brokers 33 62 
132 Insurance carriers 33 63 
133 Insurance agents, brokers, and service 33 64 
134 Real estate 33 65 
135 Royalties 33 n.a. 
136 Owner-occupied dwellings 33 n.a. 
 
 
 
Services 
137 Hotels 34 701 
138 Other lodging places 34 702-704 
139 Laundry, cleaning, and shoe repair 34 721,725 
140 Personal services, nec. 34 722,729 
141 Beauty and barber shops 34 723,724 
142 Funeral service and crematories 34 726 
143 Advertising 34 731 
144 Services to buildings 34 734 
145 Miscellaneous equipment rental and leasing 34 735 
146 Personnel supply services 34 736 
147 Computer and data processing services 34 737 
148 Miscellaneous business services 34 732,733,738 
149 Automotive rentals, without drivers 34 751 
150 Automobile parking, repair, and services 34 752-754 
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151 Electrical repair shops 34 762 
152 Watch, jewelry, & furniture repair 34 763,764 
153 Miscellaneous repair services 34 769 
154 Motion pictures 34 781-783 
155 Video tape rental 34 784 
156 Producers, orchestras, and entertainers 34 792 
157 Bowling centers 34 793 
158 Commercial sports 34 794 
159 Amusement and recreation services, nec. 34 791,799 
160 Offices of health practitioners 34 801-804 
161 Nursing and personal care facilities 34 805 
162 Hospitals 34 806 
163 Health services, nec. 34 807-809 
164 Legal services 34 81 
165 Educational services 34 82 
166 Individual and miscellaneous social services 34 832,839 
167 Job training and related services 34 833 
168 Child day care services 34 835 
169 Residential care 34 836 
170 Museums, botanical, zoological gardens 34 84 
171 Membership organizations 34 86 
172 Engineering and architectural services 34 871 
173 Research and testing services 34 873 
174 Management and public relations 34 874 
175 Accounting, auditing, and other services 34 872,89 
176 Private households 34 88 
 
 
 
Government 
177 U.S. Postal Service 35 NA 
178 Federal electric utilities 35 NA 
179 Federal government enterprises, nec. 35 NA 
180 Federal general government 35 NA 
181 Federal government capital services  35 NA 
182 Local government passenger transit 35 NA 
183 State and local electric utilities 35 NA 
184 State and local government enterprises, nec. 35 NA 
185 State and local government hospitals 35 NA 
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186 State and local government education 35 NA 
187 State and local general government, nec. 35 NA 
188 State and local government capital services 35 NA 
 
 
 
Special Industries 
189 Noncomparable imports NA NA 
190 Scrap, used and secondhand goods NA NA 
191 Rest of the world industry NA NA 
192 Inventory valuation adjustment NA NA 
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Table 2.3 35-Order Industries and Mapping to 4 Sectors 
35-ORDER 
INDUSTRY 
NUMBER 
4-SECTOR 
MAPPING DESCRIPTION 
1 D Agriculture 
2 D Metal mining 
3 D Coal mining 
4 D Oil and gas extraction 
5 D Non-metallic mining 
6 C Construction 
7 A Food and kindred products 
8 A Tobacco 
9 D Textile mill products 
10 A Apparel 
11 D Lumber and wood 
12 C Furniture and fixtures 
13 D Paper and allied 
14 D Printing, publishing and allied 
15 D Chemicals 
16 A Petroleum and coal products 
17 D Rubber and misc plastics 
18 D Leather 
19 D Stone, clay, glass 
20 D Primary metal 
21 D Fabricated metal 
22 C Machinery, non-electrical 
23 C Electrical machinery 
24 C Motor vehicles 
25 C Transportation equipment & ordnance 
26 C Instruments 
27 C Misc. manufacturing 
28 A Transportation 
29 A Communications 
30 A Electric utilities 
31 A Gas utilities 
32 A Trade 
33 A Finance Insurance and Real Estate 
34 A Services 
35 A Government enterprises 
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Table 2.4 Regression Results 
SIMULTANEOUS NONLINEAR LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION 
VARIABLE ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR 
γc 0.8081 0.0041 
γd 0.6182 0.0044 
ln(εc) 1.5737 0.0555 
ln(εd) 1.7881 0.0657 
γ1/ γ3 0.2010 0.0034 
γ3 0.2254 0.0230 
ln(εa) 2.0684 0.0206 
θa 0.1464E-05 0.8336E-07 
LABOR ADJUSTMENT COST REGRESSION 
VARIABLE ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR 
α1 0.0159 0.0053 
α2 0.0181 0.0009 
COBB-DOUGLAS PREFERENCE PARAMETER REGRESSION 
VARIABLE ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR 
µ 0.2984 0.0348 
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Table 2.5 Parameters: Values and Descriptions 
PARAMETER VALUE DESCRIPTION 
γ1a 0.0451 Sector A: CD production parameter 
γ2a 0.7295 Sector A: CD production parameter 
γ3a 0.2254 Sector A: CD production parameter 
γc 0.8081 Sector C: CD production parameter 
γd 0.6182 Sector D: CD production parameter 
εa 7.9121 Sector A: technical change parameter 
εc 4.8245 Sector C: technical change parameter 
εd 5.9781 Sector D: technical change parameter 
θa 0.1464E-05 Sector A: hourly labor in Ka production parameter 
θb 0.1464E-05 Sector B: hourly labor in Kb production parameter 
δn1 0.05 Sector A: natural attrition rate of salaried workers 
δka 0.1 Sector A: capital depreciation rate 
δkb 0.1 Sector A: capital depreciation rate 
α1 0.0159 Sector A: adjustment cost parameter (net hiring squared) 
α2 0.0181 Sector A: adjustment cost parameter (gross hiring squared) 
µ 0.2984 Consumer: CD preference parameter 
ψ 0.25 Probability of being caught shirking 
g(σ) 1.01 Extra utility from shirking 
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Table 2.6 Exogenous Variables: Values and Descriptions 
EXOGENOUS 
VARIABLE 
VALUE  DESCRIPTION  
P 1 Numeraire price of consumer good produced in sector A 
1L  6 Required hours for salaried workers in sector A 
Pop 91634000 Population 
E1 10 Flextime endowment for salaried workers 
E2 16 Time endowment for hourly workers (E2 = E1 + 1L ) 
r 0.05 Interest rate 
τq 0.05 Sales tax on the consumer good  
τd 0.293 Dividends tax 
τw 0.257 Wage tax on implied wages for salaried workers 
τL1 0 Flextime wage tax on salaried workers 
τL2 0.257 Wage tax on hourly workers 
τxm 0.05 Intermediate goods tax 
τxk 0.05 Raw capital tax 
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Table 2.7  Endogenous Variables: Steady State Results and Descriptions 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLE 
STEADY 
STATE 
VALUE 
DESCRIPTION 
Qnet 6.84E+08 Sector A: net output (consumer goods) 
C 3.09E+06 Sector A: labor adjustment cost (lost output) 
H1 1.31E+04 Sector A: salaried labor hiring rate 
N1 2.62E+05 Sector A: number of salaried workers 
L1a 1.04 Sector A: flextime hours used per salaried worker 
Xma 2.44E+08 Sector A: intermediate goods used in production 
Ia 8.10E+06 Sector A: investment  
Ka 8.10E+07 Sector A: capital created and used in production 
Xka 8.10E+06 Sector A: raw capital used in capital formation 
L2a 9.61E+07 Sector A: hourly labor used in capital formation 
Da 3.40E+08 Sector A: gross dividends 
ρ 2.13 Rental price of capital services Kb 
Ib 2.71E+06 Sector B: investment 
Kb 2.71E+07 Sector B: capital services produced 
Xkb 2.71E+06 Sector B: raw capital used in capital formation 
L2b 1.07E+07 Sector B: hourly labor used in capital formation 
Db 3.75E+07 Sector B: gross dividends 
Xk 1.08E+07 Sector C: raw capital produced 
Kbc 5.87E+05 Sector C: capital services used in production 
L2c 3.08E+06 Sector C: hourly labor used in production 
Pk .632 Price of raw capital 
Xm 2.44E+08 Sector D: intermediate goods produced 
Kbd 2.65E+07 Sector D: capital services used in production 
L2d 5.34E+07 Sector D: hourly labor used in production 
Pm .634 Price of intermediate goods 
Q1 64.1 Salaried Workers: consumption 
J1 8.96 Salaried Workers: leisure 
S1 2.49 Salaried Workers: lump sum government subsidy 
Ls1 1.04 Salaried Workers: flextime labor supply 
WL1 17.7 Salaried Workers: flextime wage rate 
W 9.78 Salaried Workers: wage rate for required hours 
Y1 226 Salaried Workers: full income 
Q2 7.30 Hourly Workers: consumption 
J2 14.2 Hourly Workers: leisure 
Ls2 1.79 Hourly Workers: labor supply 
WL2 1.71 Hourly Workers: wage rate 
S2 2.49 Hourly Workers: lump sum government subsidy  
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Y2 25.7 Hourly Workers: full income 
G 2.28E+08 Government expenditure 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX 1.1 
In order to confirm that the model is saddle path stable, first define the 
equations of motion as: 
 
1.31 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )
f
r
cxr1N''gxN
s'hx
r
cxr1Ngx
r
2
22
'
.
≡
∂
∂
+−
θ+


∂
∂
+−−δ+ρ
=   
1.32 ksxrNs
.
≡δ−θ= . 
 
And define the matrix A to be: 
 
1.33 








∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
ssss
ssss
s
k
r
k
s
f
r
f
A . 
 
Evaluating these derivatives results in the matrix: 
 
1.34 
( ) ( )
( )( )








δ−θ
∂
∂
+−
θδ+ρ
=
xN
r
cxr1N''gxN
s''hx
A
2
22 . 
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The stability of the system depends on the eigenvalues of the A matrix.  If the 
eigenvalues of A are both real and have opposite signs, then the system is saddle 
path stable.  The following equation can be used to find the eigenvalues (ε) of a 
matrix: 
 
1.35 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
ADet4ATrATr 2 −
+
−
=ε . 
 
If the determinant of A is less than zero, then according to equation 1.35 the 
eigenvalues will be real and have opposite signs.  The determinant of matrix A is: 
 
1.36 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )
0
r
cxr1N''gxN
s''hxNADet
2
22
22
<
∂
∂
+−
θ
−δ−δ+ρ= . 
 
The first term is less than zero since r and δ are both positive.  The numerator of 
the second term is positive since N is greater than zero and h’’(s) is assumed to be 
greater than zero.  The first term of the denominator is positive since g’’() is also 
assumed to be greater than zero.  Finally the second term of the denominator, 
2
2
r
c
∂
∂ , is assumed to be greater than zero, so the entire second term of the 
expression is positive.  This means the determinant of A is a negative number 
minus a positive number and the result is less than zero.  A negative determinant 
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implies that the eigenvalues are real and have opposite signs, which in turn 
implies that the model is saddle path stable.   
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APPENDIX 1.2 
The isoclines in the phase diagram represent the places where the one of 
the equations of motion is equal to zero.  Setting the equation of motion for s 
equal to zero results in: 
 
1.37 sxrN0s
.
δ=θ⇒= . 
 
Totally differentiating this expression yields: 
 
1.38 dsdrxN δ=θ . 
 
Rearranging equation 1.38, we find the slope of the 0s
.
=  isocline: 
 
1.39 0
xNds
dr
>
θ
δ
= . 
 
The 0s
.
=  isocline is upward sloping, linear and passes through the origin.   
Now turning to the equation of motion for r and setting it equal to zero we 
find: 
 
1.40 ( ) ( )( ) ( )s'hx
r
cxr1N'gx0r
.
θ−=


∂
∂
+−−δ+ρ⇒= . 
 
Totally differentiating this expression resulting in equation 1.41: 
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1.41 ( ) ( )( ) ( )dss''hxdr
r
cxr1N''gxN 2
22 θ−=




∂
∂
+−δ+ρ . 
 
From this equation we find that the slope of the 0c
.
=  is: 
 
1.42 ( )
( ) ( )( )
0
r
cxr1N''gxN
s''hx
ds
dr
2
22
<




∂
∂
+−δ+ρ
θ−
= . 
 
The numerator of this expression is less than zero since θ, x  and h’’(s) are 
positive.  In the denominator, ρ and δ are both positive, N and g’’() are both 
greater than zero and 2
2
r
c
∂
∂  is positive.  This means the denominator is positive 
and the entire expression is less than zero.  The 0r
.
=  isocline is downward 
sloping; however, no more can be said about its shape without assuming 
something about the functional forms of g(), h() and c(). 
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APPENDIX 1.3  
The signs of ds/dθ and dr/dθ  indicate how the model responds to a change 
in θ.  First, focusing on dr/dθ  expressed in terms of the partial derivatives of 
equations 1.12 and 1.13: 
 
1.43 
s
rs
r
s
s
k
kff
k
kff
d
dr
−
+−
=
θ
θ
θ
. 
 
Writing out those partial derivatives and signing them based on the assumptions 
about the variables and functions in this model we find: 
 
1.44 
( )
( )
( ) 0s'hxf
0s''hxf
0f
0xNrk
0k
0xNk
s
r
s
r
>=
>θ=
>δ+ρ=
>=
<δ−=
>θ=
θ
θ
 
 
Using the signs of these partial derivatives it is clear that dr/dθ is less than zero.  
A decrease in θ will result in an increase in r. 
Now turning our attention to ds/dθ, shown in equation 1.45 expressed in 
terms of the partial derivatives of equations 1.12 and 1.13: 
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1.45 
s
r
rs
r
r
f
k
fk
f
k
fk
d
ds
+−
−
=
θ
θ
θ
. 
 
With the signs of these partial derivatives from 1.44, it is clear that the sign of 
ds/dθ is indeterminate.  The sign of ds/dθ  depends on the sign of the numerator 
of 1.45.  This condition is shown in equation 1.46: 
 
1.46 0
d
ds
>
θ
   iff   ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0s'hx
r
cxr1N''gxNr 2
22
>−




∂
∂
+−δ+ρ
θ
. 
 
Expressing this as a condition on θ: 
 
1.47 0
d
ds
>
θ
   iff   
( ) ( )( )
( )s'hx
r
cxr1N''gxNr 2
22




∂
∂
+−δ+ρ
<θ . 
 
Unfortunately, this expression does not lend itself to a simple interpretation. 
We can also learn about ds/dθ and dr/dθ from changes in the phase 
diagram due to a change in θ.  We already found expressions for the slopes of the 
0s
.
=  and 0r
.
=  isoclines in Appendix 1.2.  Restating those results, the slope of 
the 0s
.
=  isocline is: 
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1.48 0
xNds
dr
>
θ
δ
= . 
 
And the slope of the 0r
.
=  isocline is: 
 
1.49 ( )
( ) ( )( )
0
r
cxr1N''gxN
s''hx
ds
dr
2
22
<




∂
∂
+−δ+ρ
θ−
= . 
 
A decrease in θ will result in an increase in the slope of the 0s
.
=  isocline making 
it steeper.  The slope of the 0r
.
=  isocline also increases as a result of a decrease 
in θ.  Since the slope is negative the change makes the isocline shallower.  The 
resulting phase diagram is shown in Figure 1.2. 
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APPENDIX 1.4 
The model contains a third equation of motion that governs the evolution 
of λ, the current value of marginal damages from the stock-pollutant.  From the 
first order condition in 1.8: 
 
1.50 ( ) ( )s'hr. +λδ+=λ . 
 
Now we rearrange the first order condition in equation 1.7 to isolate λ and 
substitute that into 1.50: 
 
1.51 
( ) ( )( )
( )s'h
x
c
jxc1N'gxr.
+
θ



∂
∂
+−−δ+
=λ . 
 
This equation describes how λ evolves over time, which subsequently influences 
how the optimal tax changes over time. 
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APPENDIX 1.5 
In the primary story modeled in this chapter, firms emit flow pollutants.  
Cleaning these flow pollutants generates a stock-pollutant.  In this appendix, the 
story is changed so that firms generate stock-pollutants, and flow pollutants are 
created by the cleanup of the stock-pollutants.  One example of such a situation is 
a firm that generates solid waste as a byproduct of production.  That solid waste 
can either be dumped in a landfill contributing to a stock-pollutant, or it can be 
incinerated in a way that creates a flow pollutant.  With a few minor changes, the 
model presented in this chapter can capture this alternate story.   These changes 
are highlighted in this appendix. 
First of all, the definitions of some of our variables need to be changed to 
fit the new story.  We still have N firms each of which emits a constant amount of 
pollution x .  However, x  is now a stock-pollutant instead of a flow-pollutant.  
The one control variable in the model is still r.  The definition of r is now the 
percentage of the new stock-pollutant that is not incinerated, instead of the 
percentage of pollution removed from the emissions.  With this definitional 
change, the total amount of flow pollution is still ( )xr1N − .  The equation of 
motion for the stock-pollutant remains the same as was stated in 1.1, with θ equal 
to one since all of the pollution not incinerated ends up in the stock.  The g() and 
h() functions for damages from flow and stock-pollutants remain the same.  The 
( )x,rc  function is now the cost of incineration where 0
r
c
<
∂
∂  and 0
r
c
2
2
=
∂
∂ .  The 
sign of the first derivative is now negative instead of positive.  An increase in r 
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still implies an increase in the amount of stock-pollutant.  However, in this new 
version of the model increasing r means a reduction in firms’ pollution control 
activity, incineration, and a reduction in costs.  Note that the sign of the second 
derivative has also changed from the original model.  While removing a 
percentage of pollution from a flow most likely is subject to decreasing returns to 
scale, the cost of incineration is more likely to be subject to constant returns to 
scale.   
Even with these changes, much of the model remains unaltered from the 
original version.  The social planner’s problem is identical to the original version.  
The Hamiltonian is unchanged along with the subsequent first order conditions 
and the resulting equations of motion.  This means 1.2 through 1.11 remain the 
same.  The phase diagram from Figure 1.1 is also identical in both versions of the 
model.  The stability analysis from Appendix 1.1 and the derivation of the slopes 
of the isoclines found in Appendix 1.2 are unaltered as well.   
Since θ is fixed at one in this version of the model, the experiment 
reducing θ is not relevant here.  Therefore, 1.12 through 1.19 and Appendix 1.3 
are not applicable to this version of the model.    
The first major difference in the results of the two models is the free 
market outcome.  In the original story, firms acting in the free market set r equal 
to zero and thus do not clean emissions at all.  This means that the stock of 
pollution never forms, only the flow pollution emitted by firms exists.  In the new 
version, firms set r equal to one in the free market and do not incinerate any of 
their waste.  This is a similar result in that the firm takes no action to reduce its 
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emitted pollution.  However, we now have a stock pollution problem instead of a 
flow pollution problem under free market conditions.   
The primary differences between the two versions of the model arise in the 
policy area.  While the condition that needs to be satisfied by an optimal policy 
remains the same as presented in 1.20 (rewritten here as 1.52), the interpretation 
of this condition has changed. 
 
1.52 ( )( )
r
cxxr1N'gx
∂
∂
=λθ+− . 
 
The marginal damage from the flow pollutant for a small change in r, the 
percentage of pollution not incinerated, is shown in the first term on the left hand 
side of 1.52.  The value of this term is positive.  The second term is the present 
value of the marginal damages from the stock-pollutant for a small change in r.  
This term is negative since, θ = 1, 0x ≥  and λ<0.  The term on the right hand 
side of this expression is the marginal cost of increasing the percentage of 
pollution that is not incinerated.  This is a negative number since reducing 
incineration reduces costs.    If the left hand side of 1.52 is less than zero, then an 
optimal level incineration, 1)r1(0 ≤−< , exists.  If the left hand side of 1.52 is 
greater than or equal to zero, then this condition will not hold since 0
r
c
<
∂
∂ .  If 
this is the case, then the optimal policy is no incineration (i.e. set r=1).  If 
increasing the flow pollutant causes greater harm than the benefit from reducing 
the stock-pollutant, then it is better to do nothing. 
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Now we look at the firm’s problem in order to find how to set the optimal 
tax.  Once again the firm chooses r to maximize profits after taxes and 
incineration costs: 
 
1.53 ( ) ( ) τθ−− xrx,rcxfmax
r
. 
The tax is now on the firm’s contribution to the stock-pollutant instead of the flow 
pollutant as in the original version.  From this optimization the firm will choose r 
to satisfy: 
 
1.54 τθ−=
∂
∂ x
r
c . 
 
Using 1.52 and 1.54 we find that the new optimal tax on a firm’s contribution to 
the stock-pollutant is: 
 
1.55 ( )( )xr1N'g1* −
θ
+λ−=τ . 
 
Now we look at what the tax would be if the regulator ignored the flow 
pollutant.  The optimality condition that would be used is: 
 
1.56 
r
cx
∂
∂
=λθ . 
 
The tax that satisfies this condition is: 
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1.57 λ−=τs . 
 
This tax is higher than the optimal tax and the resulting level of incineration is 
strictly greater than the optimal level of incineration.  Given the nature of the flow 
pollutant in this example, it is rather unlikely that a regulator actually would 
ignore the flow pollutant. 
Transboundary issues could be very important when looking at the 
decision between incineration and contributing to a landfill.  As in the original 
model, we make γ be the proportion of the flow pollutant damage that affects the 
upstream state.  The tax set by a regulator from the upstream state would thus be: 
 
1.58 ( )( )xr1N'gup −
θ
γ
+λ−=τ . 
 
This tax is greater than the optimal tax so the corresponding level of incineration 
will be higher than the optimal level.  This, of course, means that the upstream 
state is using the tax to encourage firms to incinerate more and thus export 
pollution to the downstream state. 
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APPENDIX 2.1 
In this appendix we examine the stability of sectors A and B in the 
theoretical model.  Since there is no interaction between the capital and labor 
adjustment costs in sector A, we can look at the stability of the two systems 
separately.  We begin by defining the equation of motion for hiring (2.37) to be Fh 
and the equation of motion for the stock of workers to be Gn (2.30).  We can now 
define the matrix Alabor as: 
 
2.102 








∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
ss1
n
ss1
n
ss1
h
ss1
h
labor
N
G
H
G
N
F
H
F
A . 
 
Substituting in the above derivatives evaluated at the steady state, we find: 
 
2.103 



δ−
α+α
δαδ+−δ+
=
1n
21
1n11n
1n
labor
1
)r()r(A . 
 
The stability of the system depends on the eigenvalues of the A matrix.  If 
the eigenvalues of A are both real and have opposite signs, then the system is 
saddle path stable.  The following equation can be used to find the eigenvalues of 
a matrix: 
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2.104 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
ADet4ATrATr 2 −
+
−
=λ . 
 
If the determinant of A is less than zero, then according to equation 2.104 the 
eigenvalues will be real and have opposite signs.  The determinant and trace of 
matrix Alabor are: 
 
2.105 0r)A(Tr labor >=  
2.106 0)r()A(Det
21
2
1n1nlabor <
α+α
αδ+δ−= . 
 
We find that the trace of Alabor is greater than zero, and the determinant of Alabor is 
less than zero.  This implies that the eigenvalues are real and have opposite signs, 
which in turn implies that the model is saddle path stable.   
We can also examine the stability of the capital system.  Following an 
analogous procedure for capital, we define the equation of motion for investment 
(2.35) to be Fia and the equation of motion for the capital stock to be Gka (2.33).  
We can now define the matrix AcapA as: 
 
2.107  








∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
ssa
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ssa
ka
ssa
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ssa
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capA
K
G
I
G
K
F
I
F
A . 
 
Substituting in the values for the partial derivatives results in: 
 127 
 
2.108 


δ−
δ+
=
ka
ka
capA 1
0)r(
A . 
 
Looking at the trace and determinant of the matrix, we find: 
 
2.109 0r)A(Tr capA >=  
2.110 0)r()A(Det kakacapA <δ+δ−= . 
 
The positive trace and negative determinant implies that the capital system is also 
saddle path stable. 
Finally, we can look at the stability of sector B.  As with the previous two 
analyses, we start by defining the equation of motion for investment (2.50) to be 
Fib and the equation of motion for the capital stock to be Gkb (2.49).  As before, 
we now define the matrix AcapB as: 
 
2.111  

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
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



∂
∂
∂
∂
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∂
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ssb
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ssb
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ssb
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ssb
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Substituting in the values for the partial derivatives results in: 
 
2.112 


δ−
δ+
=
kb
kb
capB 1
0)r(
A . 
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Looking at the trace and determinant of the matrix, we find: 
 
2.113 0r)A(Tr capB >=  
2.114 0)r()A(Det kbkbcapB <δ+δ−= . 
 
The positive trace and negative determinant implies that the capital system is also 
saddle path stable. 
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APPENDIX 2.2 
By setting the equations of motion for hiring (2.37) and the salaried labor 
stock (2.30) equal to zero and rearranging them, we can find equations describing 
the 0H1
.
=  and 0N1
.
=  isoclines.  The following equation tells us about the 0N1
.
=  
isocline: 
 
2.115 11n11
.
NH0N δ=⇒= . 
 
This equation tells us that the 0N1
.
=  isocline is linear, passes through the origin, 
and has a slope equal to δn1.  The equation below describes the 0H1
.
=  isocline: 
 
2.116 1
21
1n1
21
1L
1
11
.
N
)()(2
)WW(
P
L
H0H
α+α
δα
+
α+α
−
=⇒=  . 
 
We can see that the 0H1
.
=  isocline is also linear.  The second term on the right 
hand side of the equation is that the slope is positive and less than the slope of the 
0N1
.
=  isocline.  The first term on the right hand side tells us where the isocline 
intercepts the H1 axis.  This term is positive if the difference between the flextime 
wage and the base wage is positive.  Note that this is the same condition that tells 
us that H1 and N1 are positive in the steady state.   
With this information about the 0H1
.
=  and 0N1
.
=  isoclines, we can place 
the isoclines in Figure 2.1.  The next step in constructing the phase diagram is to 
see what happens away from the isoclines.  Looking at the equation of motion for 
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N1 (2.30), we can see that if we step away from the isocline by increasing H1, then 
N1 will rise.  If we decrease H1, then N1 will fall.  This gives us the horizontal 
arrows in the four quadrants of the phase diagram.  Turning to the H1 equation of 
motion (2.34), we see that if we step off of the isocline by increasing H1, then H1 
begins to rise, and the opposite happens if we look below the H1 isocline.  We can 
now complete the directional arrows in the four quadrants of the phase diagram.  
The final step is to verify that the model is saddle path stable, which is done in 
Appendix 2.1, and draw in the saddle path, which completes the phase diagram. 
The I-K phase diagrams for sectors A and B have similar derivations.  By 
setting the equations of motion for capital in sectors A (2.33) and B (2.49) equal 
to zero and rearranging, we can find the following equations that describe their 
respective isoclines: 
 
2.117 akaaa
.
KI0K δ=⇒=  
2.118 bkbbb
.
KI0K δ=⇒= . 
 
These equations tell us that, for sectors A and B, the 0Ka
.
=  and 0Kb
.
=  isoclines 
are linear, pass through their respective origins, and both have slopes equal to the 
decay rate of capital.  Turning to the 0Ia
.
=  and 0Ib
.
=  isoclines, we set the 
equations of motion for investment in the two sectors (2.35 and 2.50) equal to 
zero and rearranging we find: 
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2.120 


−
δ+
ρ
θ
=⇒= k
kbb2L
bb
.
P
)r(W2
1I0I . 
 
These equations tell us that both the 0Ia
.
=  and 0Ib
.
=  isoclines are linear and 
have slopes of zero.  The only difference between the two of them is where they 
intercept the Ia and Ib axes.  We can now place the isoclines in their respective 
phase diagrams.  We can find the directional arrows to place in the four quadrants 
of the phase diagrams by following the same procedure used for the H1-N1 phase 
diagram.  These systems were shown to be saddle path stable in Appendix 2.1, so 
we can place the saddle paths to complete the phase diagrams.  
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APPENDIX 2.3 
 We can use the phase diagrams to see how the firm responds to a variety 
of exogenous shocks.  Here we will show the results of an announced temporary 
decrease in τw for salaried workers.  The phase diagram and integral curves for 
this experiment are shown in Figure 2.8: 
 
Figure 2.8 Effects of an Announced Temporary Decrease of τw 
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In the phase diagram above, the firm begins at the steady state equilibrium shown 
by point a.  As soon as the announcement is made that a temporary decrease in the 
tax rate on the implied hourly wage rate for salaried workers, the firm increases 
its hiring rate and jumps to point b.  In the period between the announcement of 
the policy and the implementation of the policy, the firms hiring rate and stock of 
employees evolves along a path dictated by the original isoclines.  This path is 
shown as the curve between points b and c where both the hiring rate and the 
stock of employees are increasing.  When the new policy is actually implemented 
and the τw falls, the 0H1
.
=  isocline shifts up from ( 0H1
.
= )1 to ( 0H1
.
= )2, and the 
evolution of the hiring rate and the capital stock is governed by the new isoclines.  
While the policy is in place, the hiring rate and the stock of employees evolves 
along the path between the points c and e.  Initially, the hiring rate begins to 
decline while the stock of employees continues to rise.  At point d, the path 
crosses the 0N1
.
=  isocline and the stock of employees begins to fall.  When the 
policy ends, the model is again governed by the original isoclines and the hiring 
rate and stock of employees evolve along the saddle path from point e back to 
point a.   
The integral curves for the evolution of the state variable N1, the control 
variable H1, and the costate variable lra1λ  are shown in Figure 2.9.  The integral 
curves tell something about the speed of the adjustments shown in the phase 
diagram.  In Figure 2.9, the announcement corresponds to the jump from point a 
to point b in Figure 2.8.  The implementation of the policy corresponds to point c 
in the phase diagram.  Point d of the phase diagram corresponds to the peak value 
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of N1, which occurs between the implementation of the policy and the end of the 
policy.  Point e corresponds with the end of the policy.  Finally, the model 
approaches to point a as the time becomes very large.   
 
Figure 2.9 Integral Curves for Announced Temporary Decrease of τw 
 
 
In this sort of experiment, we see the importance of the intertemporal perspective.  
In the steady state, nothing has changed; however, the dynamic path shows that 
the firm is undergoing many changes in the intermediate periods. 
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APPENDIX 2.4 
This appendix lists all of the equations included in the steady state 
computational model.  The equations included from sector A are: the factor 
demand for intermediate goods: 
 
2.12 ( )( ) a2
a
1
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2
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1
a
2
1
m
a
3
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1
1
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m PW
PKX
γ
γ−
γ
γ
γ 


 γ



 γ
ε=  , 
 
the factor demand for flextime labor: 
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1
1
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2
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a
2
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the condition imposing price equal to marginal cost: 
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the functional form of adjustment costs:  
 
2.36 ( ) 212211n1111 )H(NH)N,C(H α+δ−α= , 
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the investment and raw capital relationship: 
 
2.16 aak IX = , 
 
the investment and hourly labor relationship: 
 
2.17 2aaa2 )I(L θ= , 
 
a new equation describing gross dividends (Da): 
 
2.121 a22Lakkamma111L11neta LWXPXPLNWNLWPQD −−−−−= , 
 
and the four equations of motion for H1, N1, Ia, and Ka, all set equal to zero: 
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2.33 akaa
.
a KIK δ−=  = 0. 
 
From sector B the steady state computational model includes the following 
equations: the raw capital factor demand equation: 
 137 
 
2.44 bbk IX = , 
 
the hourly labor factor demand: 
 
2.45 
2
bb
b
2 )I(L θ= , 
 
 the equations of motion for Ib and Kb set equal to zero: 
 
2.50 
b2L
bb2Lkkbb
.
W2
)IWP)(r(I
θ
ρ−θ+δ+
=  = 0 
2.49 bkbbb
.
KIK δ−=  = 0, 
 
and a new expression for gross dividends (Db): 
 
2.122 b22Lbkkbb LWXPKD −−ρ= . 
 
The steady state computational model also includes the following equations from 
sectors C and D: their factor demands for capital services: 
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their factor demands for hourly labor: 
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and the zero profit conditions:  
 
2.56 )1)(KLW(XP xkcbc22Lkk τ+ρ+=  
2.60 )1)(KLW(XP xmdbd22Lmm τ+ρ+= . 
 
For the two consumer types, the steady state computational model includes: their 
demand equations for the consumption good: 
 
2.63 11q YQ)1(P µ=τ−  
2.68 22q YQ)1(P µ=τ− , 
 
their demand equations for leisure: 
 
2.64 111L1L Y)1(J)1(W µ−=τ−  
2.69 222L2L Y)1(J)1(W µ−=τ− , 
 
their labor supply equations: 
 139 
 
2.65 
Pop
)1)(DD(SL)1(WYL)1(W dba11w1
s
11L1L
τ−+
−−τ−−µ=τ−  
2.70 
Pop
)1)(DD(SYL)1(W dba22
s
22L2L
τ−+
−−µ=τ− , 
 
and finally, their full income definitions: 
 
2.62 
Pop
)1)(DD(SE)1(WL)1(WY dba111L1L1w1
τ−+
++τ−+τ−≡  
2.67 
Pop
)1)(DD(SE)1(WY dba122L2L2
τ−+
++τ−≡ . 
 
Three equations are included from the government sector: the government 
revenue equation: 
 
2.71 =G 2s22L2L1s11L1L11w NLWNLWNLW τ+τ+τ  
         mmxmkkxk2211qbad XPXP)NQNQ(P)DD( τ+τ++τ++τ+ , 
 
the government expenditure equation: 
 
2.72 2211 NSNSG += , 
 
and the equal subsidy definition: 
 
2.73 21 SS = . 
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The efficiency wage condition needed to ensure salaried workers rationally 
choose the high level of effort: 
 
2.75 ( ) )ln(r
)J()Q(
)ln(rr
)J()Q)((g)ln(
r
)J()Q( 122
1
11
1
11
ψ−
+
ψ−−
σψ
=
µ−µµ−µµ−µ
. 
 
Finally, the steady state computational model includes five of the six market 
clearing conditions: market-clearing conditions for both types of labor: 
 
2.77 1s1 LL =  
2.78 d2c2b2a22s2 LLLLNL +++= , 
 
the intermediate goods market clearing condition: 
 
2.79 amm XX = , 
 
the raw capital market clearing condition: 
 
2.80 bkakk XXX += , 
 
and finally the capital services market clearing condition: 
 
2.81 dbcbb KKK +=  . 
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The consumption good market clearing condition (2.76) is dropped in order to 
satisfy Walras’ law. 
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APPENDIX 2.5 
As a further comparison of the high and low adjustment cost cases of the 
temporary increase of τs simulation, we can look at the equivalent variations for 
the two cases.41 
 
Table 2.8 Equivalent Variation: High and Low Labor Adjustment Costs 
 EV G Old G New  G Change MCPF 
High Costs -1.36E+07 1.86E+09 2.30E+09 4.44E+08 1.031 
Low Costs -1.49E+07 1.98E+09 2.45E+09 4.69E+08 1.032 
 
Here we see a somewhat surprising result, the equivalent variation his larger for 
the case with low labor adjustment costs than it is for the case with high labor 
adjustment costs.  In light of what actually happens to salaried workers in the two 
cases, this result should actually be expected.  The efficiency wage condition tells 
us that the salaried workers will always be better off than hourly workers, and in 
the low labor adjustment cost case, more salaried workers are loosing their jobs 
and becoming hourly workers than in the high labor adjustment cost case.  Clearly 
then, more people are harmed by the policy in the low labor adjustment cost case 
than in the high labor adjustment cost case, and this is born out by the equivalent 
                                                 
41 It should be noted that the comparison of equivalent variations here is unlike comparing two 
policies.  This is because the two simulations start at different base cases due to the different 
values assigned to the labor adjustment cost parameters. 
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variation results.  Conversely, if the economy experiences a positive shock, then 
more people will benefit in the low labor adjustment cost case than in the high 
labor adjustment cost case.  The inclusion of labor adjustment costs can have a 
significant impact on the analysis of a policy’s equivalent variation.    
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APPENDIX 2.6 
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